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WESTERN IDEOLOGY, JAPANESE PRODUCT
SAFETY R E G U L A T I O N AND
I N T E R N A T I O N A L TRADE
DAVID COHENt
KAREN MARTIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
I n the forty years since the end of the Second World War, Japan
has emerged from its post-war position of near economic devastation
to become one of Canada's, and indeed one of North America's,
leading trade partners.' AIthough Canada was the world's seventh
largest exporter to Japan in 1981 (fourth if oil exporting countries
are excluded): the high political profile of United States-Japan
trade relations has tended to shadow the importance of CanadaJapan trade. Since 1973 Japan has been Canada's second largest
export market, trailing only the United state^.^ The traditional composition of the exports and imports of both Japan and Canada is
Of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
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I n 1981, Japan had exports to North America totalling $42.3 billion (U.S.)
and imports from North America totalling almost $30 billion (U.S.) : 30: I,
1981 YEARBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
STATISTICS
(1g82), a t 537.
Id., a t 197,
Supra, note I.
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reflected in the trade figures: an overwhelming percentage of Canada's exports to Japan falls within the category of raw materials,
and a corresponding percentage of Japan's exports to Canada are
manufactured goods.4
Canada has maintained a consistent trade surplus with Japan
since 1973, in contrast to its trade balances with the United States
This may explain Canand the European Economic C~mmunity.~
ada's relative reticence in the wake of international (largely American) criticism of Japanese trade policies.' The United States' deficit
with Japan has resulted in considerable trade friction between the
two countries, and has led to charges by American businessmen and
government officials that the Japanese market is unfairly and unnecessarily closed to foreign i~nporters.~
In April of 1983, a former
Japanese ambassador to the United States commented that he had
"never seen the mood on Capitol Hill as ugly as it is now toward
the Japanese".'
Hostility toward Japanese trade policy is not, however, confined
to the United States. Recently, both France and Canada instituted
systematic customs slowdowns as protectionist measures directed respectively against Japanese videotape recorders and autom~biles.~

5
6

7

8

9

I n 1981 fully manufactured goods constituted 4% of Canadian exports to
Japan, while they represented 95.5% of Japanese exports to Canada: Statistics Canada. For a comprehensive analysis, see CANADA'S
EXPORTDEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR JAPAN
(Department of External M a i n Publication)
(1g82), at 218-19. See also Government of Canada, Industry, Trade, and
FOR CANADIAN
EXPORTERS
: JAPAN ( I 979),
Commerce Publication, MARKETS
at 21.
I n recent years, Canada has experienced moderate success in increasing its
exports of semi-processed and fully manufactured goods to Japan: Canadian
Goods Find Japanese Market, THEGLOBEAND MAIL, 7 May 1984, at IB8.
Supra, note I.
But see infra, note g and accompanying text for an example of measures
taken by the Canadian government to protest Japanese trade policy.
See Subcommittee on Trade, 95th Cong., nd Sess., TASK
FORCEREPORTON
UNITEDSTATES-JAPAN
TRADE
(1979); and 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)
FORCEREPORT(1979) and TASK
FORCEREPORT
[hereinafter cited as TASK
(1g80)l; American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, United States-Japan
Trade White Paper (1979) 26 JAPAN Q. 491; S. Ohara, Each Side Should
Make Cool Assessment of its Position Before Blaming the Other, THEJAPAN
ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, I May I 984, at 24.
Nobuhiko Ushiba is quoted in L. Morrow, All the Hazards and Threats of
Success, TIME, I Aug. 1983, at 22.
Id.; Tighter Customs Inspections Slow Flow of Japanese Cars, THE GLOBE
AND MAIL, 2 June 1982, at B6, col. I ; Flow of Japanese Cars at Idling
POST, 5 June 1982, at 4, col. 4. See also EC makes
Speed, THE FINANCIAL
JOURNAL,
Harsh Demands on Japan to Boost Imports, THE JAPAN ECONO~IIC
20 Oct. 1981, at I .
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While Canada's role in influencing the Japanese to open their market to foreign manufactured goods has been less visible, the Canadian government, Canadian private enterprise, and private trade
organizations have been quietly negotiating with their Japanese
counterparts. The result has been significant positive developments
in Canada-Japan trade relations in the recent past.1°
Although it is too early to measure the effects, the Japanese have
been responsive to Western complaints about non-tariff barriers, as
evidenced by recent unilateral trade liberalization measures. Moreover, several statements in defence of Japanese trade policies ought
to be made. First, the notion of a closed Japanese market may be
outdated in light of the recent reduction of trade barriers. Second,
many of the difficulties encountered by foreign firms attempting to
penetrate the Japanese market are attributable to a misunderstanding of Japanese culture and a failure to undertake adequate market
research or product modification.ll Finally, certain non-tariff barriers, especially those relating to product safety regulation, are based
on an existing balance of legal and social institutions in Japan which
is designed to respond to risks to health and safety associated with
consumer product use. Modification of the trade barriers, without
substantial reform of Japanese domestic products liability laws and
the establishment of a sophisticated products liability litigation system, ~vouldbe unrealistic. Equally unrealistic would be Western
demands for the adoption of Western legal culture. Trade policies
cannot be nicely divorced from the Japanese domestic legal environment, nor from the society and culture which that environment
reflects.
For example, in 1981 the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) was the
first organization of its kind to enter an agreement authorizing it to test and
certify, outside of Japan, a limited range of electrical products destined for
the Japanese market. See Canadian Standards Association, ANNUAL
REPORT
(1g81), a t 20.
While American business was involved in protracted negotiations with the
Japanese in an attempt to force abandonment of the "buy Japanesey' procurement policy by Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Public Corporation
(NTT), a group of Canadian firms was successful in breaking into the telecommunications supply network of NTT. See Canadian Firms Penetrating
Japanese Telecommunications, THEGLOBEAND MAIL, 2 2 April 1983, at
B I ~ col.
, I.
At the same time, protectionist attitudes have not disappeared, and in fact
may be developing increased support: Trade Group Urges Lower Import
Limits, THEGLOBEAND MAIL, I Oct. 1983, at IB3, col. I.
11 For a defence of the Japanese position, see R. Sinha, Western Outcry
Against Japanese Import Restriction Does Not Have Much Justification,
THEJAPAN ECONOBIIC
JOURNAL, I June 1982, a t 20; A. Soejima, American
Complaints are Often Bmed on Outdated Image, THEJAPAN ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, 19 Jan. 1982, a t no.
10
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For the purposes of this paper, the barriers to an open Japanese
market will be divided into two categories: Direct Official Barriers,
and Non-TarifF Barriers (NTBs).12 The fist category consists of
positive restraints on imports such as tariffs and quotas. In response
to Western criticism the Japanese government has, since the early
1g6os, undertaken measures to dismantle gradually the aggressive
protectionist wall which may have been necessary to revive the Japanese economy after the Second World War?3 In fact, in terms of
quotas and tariffs, many observers presently consider Japan to be
less "protectionistyythan many North American and European countries.14 Despite these trade liberalization measures Western complaints have not ceased, largely because of the continued presence of
barriers contained in the second category, namely, those of a nontariff nature.
Non-tarifF trade barriers, l i e the more obvious tariff and quota
restrictions, are barriers "that have the effect of restricting or
modifying the volume, composition, and direction of international
trade".15 NTBs have customarily been segregated into two categories, those which are the reflection of governmental regulatory measures: and those which result from private practices. Examples of
governmental regulatory measures include government procurement
12

l3

14

15

For a detailed analysis of these two categories see K. Abbott and C. Totman, "Black Ships" and Balance Sheets: The Japanese Market and U.S.
Japan Relations (1981) 3 Nw. J. INT'L
LAWB BUS. 103, at 116 et seq.
The war was responsible for 2.8 million deaths and the destruction of 40%
of the nation's capital stock: ASIA'S NEW GIANT: HOW THE JAPANESE
ECONOMY
WORKS (H. Patrick, H. Rosovsky eds. 1976), a t g. With the
dissolution of the Empire, over six million people returned home to an economy whose industrial production stood at 20% of the 1934-36 average. See
R. Sinha, JAPAN'S OPTIONSFOR THE 1980s ( 1 9 8 2 ) ~at 1-2.
During the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Japanese
tariff reductions of almost 60% were agreed upon, and apparently are being
complied with conscientiously. For example, since early 1982 Japanese t a r i f f s
have been cut on over 323 items, and quotas have been eliminated on over
134 items. The average Japanese tariff on mining and manufacturing products is 3% compared with the 4% American average and the 5% EEC
average. By the end of the implementation of the GATT Tokyo Round
reductions in 1987, Japan's average tariff levels will be lower than U.S.
tariff levels on comparable industrial products. REPORTOF THE JAPANUNITEDSTATESECONOMIC
RELATIONS
GROUP(prepared for the President of
the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan) ( 1 9 8 1 ) ~at 57.
C. Prestieau and J. Henry, NON-TARIFF
TRADE
BARRIERS
AS A PROBLEM
IN
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
(1972), a t 55. A Japanese description of the
Japanese import system in 1978 reveals an extraordinarily complex array of
rules, guidelines and administration procedures. See Jetro, JAPAN'S IMPORT
SYSTEM( 1 9 7 8 ) ~at 4-9.
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poZicieS,le customs practices,1' ccadmiitrative guidance",18 and
product standards and certification requirements. While quantitative
measurement of the impact of non-tariff barriers is notoriously dificult, it has been estimated that over one-half of the non-tariff barriers
in Japan are related to health and safety standards and regulati~ns.'~
The non-tariff barriers presented by private practices are traditionally distinguished from direct official barriers and governmental
regulatory measures in that they represent trade obstacles inherent
in the Japanese language and culture. After the opening of Japan
to the West, foreigners quickly discovered that the Japanese have
their o m ways of doing things. Japanese language and culture present barriers not only to foreign businessmen, but to any foreigner
who attempts to deal with the Japanese. St. Francis Xavier, a Jesuit
missionary who travelled to Japan in the early sixteenth century,
eventually concluded that the Japanese language had been formed
by the Devil itself in order to frustrate God's Providence?" I n addition to the obvious language barrier, foreigners are faced with the
complex problems of understanding the Japanese decision-making
process? the hierarchy of human relationships? and complex prodI n the past, Japanese quasi-governmental agencies such as NTT and the
Japan National Railway, allegedly acting contrary to the MTN Government
Procurement Code, were unwilling to open their supply system to foreign
manufacturers. For the American experience in attempting to break into this
FORCEREPORT(1980), supra, note 7, a t 25-19. See also
market, see TASK
supra, note 14, at 63; J. Jackson, J. Louis, and M. Matsushita, Implementing
the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing Economic Rules (1982) 81
MICH. L. REV. 267, a t 327.
1 7 Supra, note 14, a t 61.
1s Administrative guidance (gyosei shido) refers to administrative actions designed to influence private conduct. Since the legal authority granted to Japanese governmental agencies is usually framed in broad terms, the agencies
often have the discretion to determine the procedures by which the legal
objectives will be obtained. This enables the agency to make recommendations or even demands which, if not followed, may result in delays and other
costs for the private citizen. See Y. Narita, Administrative Guidance (1968)
2 LAWIN JAPAN 45; R. Lury, Japanese Administrative Practice: The Discretionary Role of the Japanese Government Official (1976) 31 Bus. LAW
210. See also Foreign Firms are Irked Over Needless Procedures, THEJAPAN
ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, I Dec. 1982, a t I ; supra, note 14, a t 61-62.
19 Sinha, supra, note 13, a t 73.
20 For a sampling of problems foreigners have with the Japanese language, see
F. Gibney, JAPAN: TEE FRAGILESUPERPOWER
(1975)~a t 144-62; B. DeMente, THEJAPANESE WAYOF DOINGBUSINESS(1g81), a t 101-15.
21 See C. Nakane, JAPANESE S O C I E(1970)~
~
a t 141-48.
22 Id., at 23-86; K. Yamamura, Behind the "Made in Japan" Label, in POLIT I C ~AND E C O N O ~ ~
INC CONTEMPORARY
S
JAPAN (M. Hyiie, J. Hirschmeier
eds. 19791, a t 134-35.
16
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uct distribution systems,23to name but a few of the more obscure
non-tariff barriers.
This paper proposes to deal with domestic consumer protection
laws and standards regulation, which have their roots in both categories. While most trade analysts differentiate between cultural and
standards barriers,24we hope to demonstrate that culture and social
custom are not nicely distinguishable from law. Design standards,
testing and certification requirements, positive substance lists and
other recognized non-tar8 barriers are as much a reflection of
culture2' as are buyer-supplier customary norms and consumer preferences for goods produced in Japan.26 Although many product
standards are explicitly set by government, either directly or through
subsidiary administrative agencies, this paper wiU illustrate that it
will be a far more intractable process to adapt these standards to
meet the demands of Japan's Western trading partners than it was
to modify existing tariff and quota structures. These non-tariff barriers are deeply rooted in the Japanese culture and psyche, are not
obviously motivated by protectionist objects, are often unarticulated
and non-specific in their effect, and are not subject to reform
through traditional international trade liberalization agreements.
In this paper the substantive and procedural aspects of products
liability law and the standards systems in place in Japan will be
outlined in order to show how they differ from the analogous products liability regime and standards systems in Canada. Although
foreign manufacturers frequently avoid insurance, product design,
23

24

25

For example, the Japanese distribution system is characterized by a large
number of small retailers and wholesalers, resulting in limited inventory
space and frequent deliveries. This may result in a competitive advantage
to' domestic manufacturers. M. Yoshino, THEJAPANESE MARKETING
SYSTEM : ADAPTATION
AND INNOVATION
( I 97 I ) .
As well, the relationship of Japanese distributors to their suppliers is such
that they will not generally carry competitive products, making it extremely
difficult for foreign suppliers to penetrate established distribution networks.
See generally Trade Barriers Come I n Creative Packages, INDUSTRY
WEEK,
Vol. 213, No. I , a t 27; United States-Japan Trade White Paper, supra, note
7; I. Hideto, Anticompetitive Practices in the Distribution of Goods and
Services in Japan: T h e Problem of Distribution Keiretsu ( 1983) J. OF JAPANESE STUD.319; Sinha, supra, note 13, a t 87-89.
The complex distribution system in Japan compares unfavourably with the
systems of Britain, West Germany and the United States when assessed in
terms of the number of times goods are exchanged before reaching the ultimate consumer. Japan: A Survey, THEECONOMIST,
g July 1983, at 13.
TASKFORCEREPORT(1g80), supra, note 7, a t 30, 35.
Id., a t 30, 31, 63.
This was a comment which frequently turned up in the responses to the
authors' questionnaire. See infra, note 27. This may manifest itself in a wellarticulated preference for Japanese products.
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and litigation costs related to products liabiity risks, Canadian
manufacturers exporting to Japan must comply with a wide range
of standards and certification regulations. We conclude that product
safety regulation in Japan, manifested both in product standards and
in products liability law, is a reflection of Japanese history, culture,
religion, and structural and institutional constraints on litigation,
and that it is unrealistic, if not arrogant, for the West to dismiss
summarily these standards as being merely protectionist barriers, or
to demand their modification in accordance with our regulatory
philosophies.
I n an attempt to obtain data describing the experience of Canadian manufacturers exporting to Japan, a survey was carried out of
139 firms chosen from a number of Japan-Canada export association membership directories. Of the 139 firms selected, 8 responded
by indicating that they had no experience with the Japanese market,
and 14firms could not be located. Of the remaining I 17 firms, 35
completed an extensive questionnaire relating to products liability
risks, insurance, Japanese standards barriers, the Japanese regulatory process, and cultural and linguistic barriers. The nature of the
responses and the limited population prevent us from evaluating
the data on a statistical or quantitative basis.27 Nevertheless, the
responses do reveal several characteristics of the Japanese market
which permit a preliminary evaluation of the impact of Japanese
product safety regulation on Canadian manufacturers.

11. PRODUCT SAFETY REGULATION AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The development of product safety regulation as a distinct body
of law can be attributed to the recent increased intrusion of governmental and judicial bodies into private market relationships with the
objective of rectifying perceived market dysfunctions. A concern on
the part of governments with the vulnerability of the average con27

The sample of Canadian firms consisted largely of companies that have a t
one time exported to Japan, for the purely practical reason that a list of
names of such firms could be compiled. The efforts of companies which have
considered exporting to Japan but decided against i t precisely because of
standards trade barriers are generally unrecorded. By canvassing the experiences of firms which were successful in breaking into the Japanese market,
there is a significant danger of underestimating the trade effects of consumer
protection law. The most drastic effect of trade barriers will have been experienced by those manufacturers who were barred from exporting to Japan,
and who for the most part are excluded from the survey.
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sumer confronted with an increasingly complex marketplaceZ8has
prompted extensive market regulation. The courts have responded
through judicial compensation awards in products liability suits, as
well as judicial regulation of the consumer contract transacting process and the substantive terms of consumer contracts.
These judicial and governmental actions which function ostensibly
to provide compensation to injured consumers, to deter deceptive
trade practices, to provide insurance against product safety risks,
and to facilitate the development of efficient markets in consumer
goods, may also have intentional or inadvertent distorting effects on
international trade. Product movement across national boundaries
may be affected by any or some of the following regulatory and
judicial measures :
( 1) overt or covert discriminatory standard^;^^
( 2) inconsistent and diverse standards among countries;30
( 3) standards which are not the most cost effective to achieve
legitimate national objectives;
( 4) certification and approval procedures;3l
( 5) import inspection procedures and administrative practices;32
( 6) country of origin marketing;33
( 7) advertising regulation;=
( 8) packaging and labelling r e g ~ l a t i o n ; ~ ~
28
29

30

31

32
33

34

35

Economic Council of Canada, REFORMING
REGULATION
( I 981 ), at 3.
The most common are standards which are apparently non-discriminatory
but which are met more easily by domestic industries. P. Sweeney, Technical
Analysis Of T h e Technical Barriers T o Trade Agreement (1980) 12 LAW
AND POLICY
IN INT. BUS. I 79, at 183.
Inconsistent standards increase information, design and manufacturing costs,
and may close the market to non-conforming products. See J. Groetzinger,
T h e New G A T T Code and the International Harmonization of Product
Standards ( I 975) 8 CORNELL
INT'L
L.J. I 68.
P. Oliver, FREEMOVEMENT
OF GOODS
IN THE E.E.C. ( 1 9 8 2 ) ~
at 89.
Id., at 92.
Id., a t 106-09. See Re Restrictions on Importation of Souvenirs: E.C. Commission v. Ireland (1982) 33 COM.MKT. L. REP. 706.
See E.C. Directive 70/50, Art. 2 (3) (m) I n Re Advertising of Alcoholic
Beverages: E.C. Commission u. France (1981) 31 Conr. MKT. L. REP. 743,
at 758, the European Court of Justice held that an advertising regulation was
equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports as it had the effect of
restricting the volume of imports as a result of its impact on marketing
prospects.
See E.C. Directive 70/50, Art. 2(3) (j), and Frietje (1981) 32 Coar. MKT.
LAWREP. 722. Canada has been accused of using language labelling requirements as a non-tariff barrier. Import Issues Torture Ottawa, FINANCIAL
POST, 14 May 1983, I, col. I.

.
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( 9) the use of design rather than performance standards;
(10) uncertainty and information search costs regarding domestic

(11) voluntary standards which are used collusively by national
manufacturers to create effective barriers to entry;37
(12) products liability risks;
(13) overt or covert judicial discrimination;
(14) overt or covert bureaucratic discrimination; and
(15) government disclosure and freedom of information policy.

It would be a difficult task to place an empirical value on the
impact these factors have on trade. I t is clear, however, that they
represent substantial increases in costs for exporters. These costs may
take the form of increased production and marketing expenses, delays which may result in loss of development potential and market
share, delayed entry into new markets, adverse effects on reputation
for quality and reliability, and expenses represented by commitments
of capita1 and management resources that could have been used
more productively in alternative investment opportunities. Moreover, potential exporters who are unable to make the necessary
adjustments or alterations for economic or technological reasons
may be forced out of or denied access to the foreign market.
Product safety regulation has tsvo components which may affect
international trade. The standard and certification barriers which
I have described represent the more obvious category. In addition,
manufacturers exporting to foreign countries will face the risk of
damage awards if their products are associated with personal injury,
property damage and economic losses in the foreign jurisdiction.
The effects on international trade of domestic products liability law
(that is, the legal rules and principles governing the liability of commercial suppliers for personal injuries, property damage and eco86

37

Uncertainty associated with the applicability of foreign consumer protection
law, the likelihood and nature of legislative or regulatory reform, and local
and provincial or state law impose considerable risks on foreign manufacturers. GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Part 3 of the Non-Tariff
Measures, Standards Involving Imports and Domestic Goods, 14 Feb. 1974
a t 3, 4 and No. 272. In addition, domestic manufacturers have the ability
to iduence the standard setter as an attribute of being located in the same
jurisdiction: W. Cline et al., TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS
IN THE TOKYO
ROUND
(1978)~at 201. See J. Shaul and M. Trebilcock, The Administration of the
Federal Hazardous Products Act (1982) 7 CAN.BUS.L.J.n, at 31.
See text accompanying notes 157-62. This does not change the fact that
products stamped with Japanese certification marks are preferred by conFOR
sumers. See Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, MARKETS
CANADIAN
EXPORTERS:
JAPAN ( I 979), a t 27.
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nornic losses associated with defective products) are varied and
subtle. T o foreign manufacturers of consumer goods, products liability risks represent current economic costs or future economic risks.
While products liability law perhaps aims ultimately at a marketplace with safer products, its deterrent effect is clearly voluntary.
Manufacturers are not obliged to produce non-defective products
but may choose to respond to products liability risks by adopting
any, or a mixture of, conceivable cost or risk reduction measures. A
product may be withdrawn from (or never introduced into) the
market; changes in design, production techniques, or quality control
procedures may be implemented to reduce the frequency of product
defects; products liability insurance may be taken out; or no positive
steps may be taken, thus making products liability risk a business
cost to be absorbed by the firm. Whichever measures are adopted,
products liability risks undeniably represent costs to manufacturers.
An evaluation of whether Japanese products liability law operates
to impede or facilitate exports to Japan requires a comparison of
products liability risks in the Japanese marketplace and in the jurisdiction of the foreign manufacturer. Exports to a particular country
will be inhibited if that country's domestic products liability rules
are "stricter" than those in the manufacturer's country. Should this
be the case, the foreign manufacturer will be confronted with a
higher probability of claims being pursued, an increased magnitude
of potential claims, or both. If the importing economy represents a
significant proportion of a firm's market, the costs associated with
products liability risks may adversely affect its export capabilities.
In the next section, we offer a brief description of Japanese products liability law and then evaluate the relative "strictness" of Canadian and Japanese products liability laws. This will permit certain
conclusions to be drawn as to their possible impact, a l l other things
being equal, on bilateral trade.

111. JAPANESE PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW38
The Japanese law of products liability, as yet not consolidated,39
can be found largely in the Civil Code:' as well as in various Acts
38

39

Major sources in English on this topic include: Z. Kitagawa, DOINGBusrNESS IN JAPAN,
Vol. 7, Part XI11 [hereinafter cited as Kitagawa] ;Y. Fujita,
Product Liability Law (1980) I JAPANL.J. 160 [hereinafter cited as Fujita];
LIABILITY:
A MANUALOF PRACTICE
IN SELECTED
Adachi et al., PRODUCT
NATIONS,
JAPAN( I 981 ) .
A draft model law on products liability was proposed in 1975 by a group of
scholars, but has not been accepted by the Ministry of Justice. Since Japan
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directed at specific areas of activity4' and in local ordinances?' The
Civil Code dates from the late nineteenth century;'3 and its drafters
did not contemplate the development of a discrete, sophisticated and
coherent body of consumer protection law. As is typical of most civil
law systems, the Code provisions are flexible and drafted in such
general
that the judiciary are not formally restrained from
applying it to new social, economic and technological phenomena.
As a body of law describing the legal obligations of suppliers and
users of products which are associated with risks to health and safety,
products liability law in Japan could be accurately described as
fairly underdeveloped relative to Western concepts of civil legal responsibilityP5Several factors may be offered to explain this phenomenon. The first is the non-litigious behaviour of the JapaneseP6 In a

40

41

4'

43
44

45

46

is a civil law jurisdiction in which general codes purport to establish a complete law for the judiciary to apply to particular facts, there is a reluctance
to create specific legislation which might excessively bind judges when the
Civil Code is conceptually broad enough to recognize this area of law. The
English translation of the proposed Act can be found in Kitagawa, supra,
note 38, at 4-40.
The Civil Code, Law No. 89, 1896, as amended. See also Kitagawa, supra,
TO JAPANESE LAW (A. Angelo
note 38, a t 4-7; and Y. Noda, INTRODUCTION
trans. 1 9 7 6 ) ~a t 197.
For example, the Drug Side Effects Injuries Relief Fund Act, Law No. 55,
1979 and the Consumer Products Safety Act, Law No. 31, 1973, which
regulate the quality of various designated products such as soft drink bottles
by requiring safety inspections and official approval prior to marketing.
See Prefectural Ordinance on Consumer Protection of Osaka Prefecture
(1973) JAPAN QUARTERLY
255. Local ordinances adopt a comprehensive
approach to products liability rather than a product by product approach.
They set out obligations which should be fulfilled by business, but because
of the Prefecture's limited authority to legislate, the ordinances represent
only recommendations and public announcements. Kitagawa, however, warns
us not to underestimate their effectiveness in Japan, and calls them one of
the most important developments in Japanese products liability law. Kitagawa, supra, note 38, a t 4-35.
H. Tanaka, THEJAPANESE LEGALSYSTEM(1976), a t 60.
For example, Article I of the Civil Code declares, "All private rights shall
conform to the public welfare", and "duties shall be carried out in accordance with the principles of good faith and trust".
"Underdeveloped" in this context can be defined in two ways. I n one sense
it can be taken to refer to a situation where the law contemplates a remedy
in theory, but which for all practical purposes is beyond the reach of the
potential p l a i n t s because of severe procedural and evidentiary problems. I n
another sense, i t can refer to legal concepts which were originally applicable
to a large range of conflict situations, and which have been artificially modified to deal with a social and economic phenomenon which did not exist
when the concepts were first articulated.
The number of civil suits per capita is reported to be 4 to 10% that of many
Western countries. See supra, note 43, a t 255-60; Material on Canada-Japan
Legal and Business Relations (Continuing Legal Education Society of British
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society that has developed a sophisticated extra-curial system of
dispute resolution,4' the litigation alternative is often regarded as a
last resort. The Japanese attitudes to litigation may be traceable in
part to the Japanese preference for "harmonious reconciliation" over
adversarial settlement of social problems. Japanese people have been
described as accepting life's problems as the consequences of nature
following its own coursep8 and participation in a lawsuit is sometimes considered shameful4gand a serious breakdown of social order.
It should also be noted that the concept of legal "rights" is a
foreign ones0that was not introduced into Japan until the late nineteenth century. The Japanese language did not even contain a word
to express the concept until kenri was coined during the period of
Western code adaptation.'l Products liability suits in tort were virtually unheard of before 1 9 6 0 . ~ ~
The judiciary has been slow to respond to the problem of consumer protection in products liability suits. Many of the principles
and conceptual approaches to Japanese products liability law have
been developed during major multiple injury casess3 (often asso-

47

*

49
50

J1

"

53

Columbia Seminar) ( I g80), at 30; D. Henderson and J. Anderson, Japanese
TO JAPANESE CMLIZATION
(A. TiedeLaw: A Profile, in AN INTRODUC~ON
man ed. 1 9 7 4 ) ~a t 570-91, reproduced in Morishima, I N T R O D UTO
C~
JAPON
ANESE LAW (1g80), at 15-16.
Some academics attribute this non-litigious behaviour to the Japanese
aversion to conflict while others explain it as a manifestation of structural
impediments to litigation, and the availability of alternative informal mechanisms for promoting dispute resolution. For the former view, see T. Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan ( 1963) LAWIN JAPAN 41 ;
and for the latter, see J. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant (1978)
4 J. OF JAPANESE STUD.359.
For example several Civil Code provisions and special legislative schemes
regulate compromise both before and during litigation and conciliation
among the conflicting interests represented in the lawsuit. These procedures
are usually executed before a summary court and may be given the effect of
formal judgment. For a detailed discussion of the various techniques, see
Kitagawa, supra, note 38, at Part XIV.
C. Kim and C. Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional
Japanese Conception of Law (1979) 28 INT'Lk COMP. LAW Q. 491, at
501-02. See also F. K. Upham, Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan:
An Interpretative Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits (1976) 10 LAW
S o c ~ REV.
~ n 579, at 591.
Kim and Lawson, id., at 503.
Id.
Henderson and Anderson, supra, note 46, at 570-91.
Kitagawa, supra, note 38, a t 4-2. See also, S. Niibori and R. Cosway,
Products Liability in Sales Transactions (1967) 42 WASH.L. REV. 483.
These cases include the thalidomide litigation of 1965, the Morigana powdered milk litigation of 1973, the "Big Four" pollution cases of the early
Ig7OS, and more recently the SMON cases involving a drug which caused a
neurological disease in I 2,000 people. See Upham, supra, note 48.
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ciated with adulterated food products and adverse pharmaceutical
reactions), and relatively little attention has been paid to the plight
of the isolated plaintiff and his difiiculties in proving his case. Since
major products liability cases are exceedingly rare, the Japanese
court has simply not had the opportunity to consider the problem
over a wide variety of s i t u a t i ~ n s . ~ ~
Finally, several,commentators have argued that the limited resort
to litigation in Japan is not simply a reflection of social myths which
characterize the Japanese as 'litigation averse' and possessing a low
level of legal consciousness. Rather, the attenuated products liability
laws may reflect the considerable structural obstacles to litigation,
including the undersupply of judges and lawyers, procedural delays,
inefficient appeal rules, and substantive evidentiary rules which operate against the interests of plaintiffs.55 Yet even accepting that
point, it is difficult to ignore the obvious argument that had litigation
been preferred, one would have expected the public institutional
framework and private activities to have developed to meet that
demand. Litigation has not been demanded by the Japanese, and
that in and of itself reveals something about attitudes and values.
In any event, and whatever the reasons, products liability law, except in cases of "mass torts" in which community interests can be
seen to justify otherwise purely individualistic behaviour, has not
achieved the prominence that it has in some Western societies.
An assessment of products liabiity risks to foreign manufacturers
must take into account several factors which define the nature and
extent of the economic risks concomitant to a decision to export to
Japan. These include substantive tort liability, substantive contract
liability, criminal liability, the effect of public insurance schemes,
and the effect of procedural and evidentiary constraints in the litigation process.

TOIT
liability under the Civil Code does not require a direct exchange relationship between the product supplier and product user

" By 1981, there had apparently only been fifty reported cases where manu"
50

facturers had been sued by injured consumers. Kitagawa, supra, note 38,
at 4-9, n. I.
See Haley, supra, note 46. In a recent article Haley has expanded on this
thesis: J. Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law
Without Sanctions (1982) 8 J. OF JAPANESE
STUDIES
274.
The cornerstone of tort law in Japan is Article 709 of the Civil Code which
provides that a "person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of
another is bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom".
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as a precondition of liability, and as a result is more flexible than
the traditional structured, bilateral concept of contract liability. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the judiciary has turned to delictual
concepts as the preferred approach in their development of products
liability law. I n addition, the conceptually vague nature of the elements of tort liability permits the courts to apply a risk-utility
analysis to the issues surrounding hazardous products, a task which
is more diicult in contract, which remains constrained by consensual arrangements.
Notwithstanding the marked differences between common law
and civil law systems, the Japanese tort approach to products liability risks is comparable in many respects to that of its Canadian
counterpart. Both are fault-based systems centred largely around
the notion of liability for negligent conduct. Both use the concept of
foreseeability to define the limits of legal responsibility, and both
have compensation for injury as their principal objective.
There are, however, several significant differences between the
Canadian and Japanese systems, the first being the recognition of
the right of recovery for pure economic loss in a tort action in Japanese law. The general rule in Canada has been that pure economic
loss (economic loss not causally related to physical injury) is not
re~overable.~~
In Japan, Article 710 of the Japanese Civil Code
places the tortfeasor under an obligation to compensate for injury
"irrespective of whether such injury was to the person, liberty, or
reputation of another, or to such person's property rights". There is
no distinction in Japanese tort law between recovery of economic
losses and recovery for injury or property damage.''
Another area of divergence between the Canadian and Japanese
tort systems is the frequency with which the respective governments
are sued in negligence actions. As it is the Japanese government that
must certify products as being fit for consumer use, the government
must often defend allegations of state negligence concerning defective
products. The Japanese do not recognize concepts of sovereign immunity, and recent Japanese cases have apportioned government
5'

58

A. Linden, CANADIAN
TORTLAW ( 1 g 8 2 ) , at 410-29. However, recent decisions in England and Canada suggest that pure economic loss may be
recoverable. See D. Cohen, Bleeding Hearts and Peeling Floors: Compensation for Economic Loss at the House of Lords ( 1 9 8 4 ) 18 U.B.C. L. REV. 289;
Kamloops v . Nielsen, Hughes and Hughes [ 1 9 8 4 ] 5 W.W.R. I , at 38-45
(S.C.C.).
Adachi, supra, note 38, at I I .
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liability from thirty-three to as high as sixty per cent.59 Although
government liability for negligent inspection is not unheard of in
Canada, it is exceedingly rare.G0
Apart from these spec& points, the articulation of liability in tort
under the Japanese Civil Code is similar to Canadian tort concepts.
In order to succeed in a tort action against a foreign manufacturer,
a Japanese plaintiff must prove that:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

the product was defective;
the defect resulted from the defendant's act;
the plaintiff suffered an injury;
the injury was caused by the defendant's product; and
the defendant violated a standard of care expected of him.

Generally the plaintiff will have little difficulty in establishing the
extent and nature of her property damage, personal injury or economic losses. She may, however, encounter serious evidentiary problems in establishing the four remaining elements of liability. The
Japanese judiciary, recognizing the plaintiff's difficulty, has adopted
several techniques which improve the plaintiff's position to some
degree. These include establishing the manufacturer's standard of
care as near-absolute in some cases, and permitting proof of causation through utilization of epidemiological data in others.
The Japanese conception of a defective product may be articulated in three ways?' As in Canada, a product may be viewed as
defective in design, in manufacture, or in the sufficiencyof warnings
and instructions which accompany it. Failure to provide adequate
information or warnings of dangerous consequences associated with
certain product uses may be considered to be a defect in product
design as, for example, where a manufacturer supplies a liquid heating agent without warning the user of its contamination by toxic

" Yagi et al. v. Japan et al., Kanazawa District Court, 879 Hanrei Jiho

26,
March 1978; Oyama et al. v. Japan et al., Tokyo District Court 899
Hanrei J i o 48, 3 Aug. 1978. Adachi, supra, note 38, at 20. See also M. R.
Reich, Public and Private Responses to a Chemical Disaster in Japan: The
Case of Kanemi Yusho (1982) 15 LAWIN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL
102, at I 19.
McCrea et al. v. White Rock et al. [I9751 2 W.W.R. 593, 56 D.L.R. (3d)
525 (B.C.C.A.); Ostash et al. v. Sonnenberg et al. and Ostash et al. v.
Aeillo [1g68] 63 W.W.R. 257, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 311 (Sask. C.A.); compare
Barratt v. Corporation of the District of North Vancouver [1g80] 2 S.C.R.
418, I 14 D.L.R. (3d) 577.
Kitagawa, supra, note 38, at 4-15.
I

00

G1
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chemicalsP2 In order to attract products liability in tort the defect
must also pose some actual or potential risk to the health or safety
of the user or other members of the p~blic.6~
The existence of a defect is determined by a state-of-the-art test
Where the design or
applied at the date of the alleged negligen~e.~~
manufacturing process in question is sophisticated, a plaintiff unfamiliar with the relevant technology may face serious difficulty in
proving the existence of the alleged defect?' It is true that the court
may, in some cases, be willing to infer the existence of a defect from
circumstantial evidence of unusual injury incurred during normal
use. There are, however, recent decisions where plaintiffs' actions
have failed because of an inability to prove the existence of the
d e f e ~ t ?Whether
~
the plaintiff's injuries occur in isolation or instead
are part of a larger products liability disaster will likely have a
significant impact on this issue, as the Japanese courts apparently
apply a risk-utility analysis to determine the existence of a defect?'
The isolated plaintiff, without access to data demonstrating the extent of the product safety risk, will often have considerable difficulty
in establishing this element of tort liability.
The plaintiff is also required to demonstrate that the defect was
in fact the cause of his injury. Once again, victims face considerable
obstacles. Not only will they be ignorant of the relevant technology,
they may not have the resources or tools to pierce the veil of industrial secrecy surrounding many commercial and industrial enterprises
in the absence of a discovery process?*
Kubota v. Kanemi Soko K . K . et al., Fukuoka District Court, 866 Hanrei
Jiho 21, 5 Oct. 1977 (The Kanemi Cooking Oil Case). Reich, supra, note
59, at 108.
63 The word 'defect' translates into one of two Japanese words: kashi, which
suggests that the product quality deviates from that which was the subject
of the contract, and kekkan which implies that the defect is dangerous, the
latter being the subject of products liability.
6 V h e Kanemi Cooking Oil Case, supra, note 62.
65 For example, in the SMON cases, the Minister of Health and Welfare commissioned a special research group to investigate the etiology of SMON,
which took two and one half years to complete. See Terms of Settlement:
The SMON Litigation (1979) 12 LAWIN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL99, a t 101.
6 6 See Ito v. Honda Giken K.K., Fukuoka District Court, 869 Hanrei Jiho 91,
15 Feb. 1977.
G7 I n determining the drug companies' liability in the SMON litigation, the
court noted that "all drugs. . . are double-edged swords producing both efficacious results and side-effects. . .The usefulness of a drug is negated if it
has disproportionately serious side-effects compared with its efficacy." Oyama
v. lapan, Tokyo District Court, 838 Hanrei Jiho 29, 17 Jan. 1977, translated
in ( I 978) I I LAWIN JAPAN 76, a t 85.
68 See text accompanying notes 102-07.
62

.
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The courts have adopted several methods to reduce the plaintiff's
evidentiary burden in certain specific tort contexts. In pollution
cases, where proof of causation can be particularly elusive, the injury
usually multiple, and the defendant often economically powerful
and perhaps unco-operative, the tools of epidemiological and statistical proof have been de~eloped.~'These developments have permitted legal causation to be established even where details of the
precise mechanism describing the etiology of the plaintiff's injury
is not clear,"' and where evidence of the specific source of pollution
is within the control of the defendant."
This approach is not representative of products liability cases in
general, but a claim exhibiting the same essential characteristics of
widespread physical harm and involving a high degree of technological and scientific uncertainty may permit a plaintiff to establish
causation through judicial acceptance of inferential techniques. In
situations of isolated or minor injury, however, proof of specific
causation remains a major obstacle to injured plaintiffs. Even where
injuries are relatively numerous, a potential plaintiff may not be
aware of, or have access to, relevant evidence regarding the frequency and incidence of injury to others who have chosen not to
litigate. This problem tvill be exacerbated to the extent that individual Japanese plaintiffs choose not to single themselves out and
take the initiative to litigate or to join plaintiff litigation associations in the case of mass torts.
The plaintiff must finally establish a violation of a standard of
care expected of the defendant. Admittedly, in many cases, demonstration of the defective product will lead to an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. As in Canadian tort law, negligence is established through the application of an objective standard to the situation of the particular defendant." The standard of
69

70

71
72

Epidemiological proof alloxvs the plaintiff to establish causation by correlating
such factors as seasonality, locality and chronology of symptoms with the production cycle of the pollutor. Statistical proof requlres correlation between a
particular effluent and the incidence of disease. See Pollution Case Law
(1973) no JAPAN QUARTERLY
251, at 251-55.
See Upham, supra, note 48, at 608-09; Komatsu et al. v. Mitsui Kinzoku,
Toyama District Court, 22 Kakyu Minshu (Nos. 5-6) Bessatsu I, 30 June
1971; Toyama et al. v. Mitsui Kinzoku, Kanazawa Branch of Nagoya High
Court, 674 Hanrei Jiho 25, g Aug. 1972.
Ono et al. v. Showa Denko, Niigata District Court, 2 2 Kakyu Minshu (Nos.
9-10) 29 Sept. 1971.
Mitsubishi Jukogyo K.K. v. Kamesake, Tokyo High Court, 863 Hanrei Jiho
47, 4 July 1977, held that an automobile dealer is not expected to detect
latent design defects in automobiles. Kato v. Namo Seiyaku K.K., Tokyo
District Court, 6 Kakyu Minshu IGO, 14 July 1955, held that a druggist is
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care (the behaviour which the court determines a person ought to
have exhibited), may be expected to vary with the expected private
and social costs of the conduct in question. In cases involving the
manufacture of food, drugs and automobiles (where defects present
a significant social risk in terms of the frequency, nature and severity
of personal injuries), the Japanese courts have imposed what is
essentially an absolute duty on the defendanti3 both to produce a
safe product and to monitor its safety on behalf of those persons
who continue to use it. Where possible cases of public hazards are
involved, enterprises are responsible for constant re-examination and
supervision of goods in circ~lation.~~
This brief description of the Japanese 'tort' products liabiity regime suggests that the economic risks defined by substantive tort law
in Japan do not differ significantly from those in Canada. Unlike
manufacturers who export to the United States, Canadian exporters
to Japan enjoy essentially the same protection from lawsuits created
by concepts of fault and causation as exist in the domestic market.
To some-extent the risks are increased in the case of exports, due to
the recognition in Japan of recovery of economic losses, and the
willingness of Japanese courts to accept inferential causation arguments. At the same time, the existence of potential state liability may
offset the perceived increase in risk. In addition, liability in tort is
simply one aspect of a much broader legal environment which encompasses contract risks, the criminal law, and the reality of prospects of litigation which are faced by exporting manufacturers. An
analysis of these aspects of potential liability offers additional insights into the impact of products liabiity on trade.
The Japanese law of contract offers two general solutions to the
problem of injuries associated with the use of defective products:

73

74
75

not required to test the drugs he sells. Both cases held that the product
manufacturer was liable in negligence for insufficient testing but in Kato,
the damage award was only $140 U.S. as the court found that the manufacturer was unaware of possible injury.
The Kanemi Cooking Oil Case, supra, note 6 2 . Negligence was prima facie
inferred in a situation where a food manufacturer produced and marketed
cooking oil contaminated with toxic polychlorinated biphenyls. During the
1970s proposals for the establishment of a strict products liability regime
received considerable study. T o date, these reform proposals have not been
implemented. See Fujita, supra, note 38, at 160.
Oyama v . Japan, supra, note 67, at 85 (translation).
For an English language discussion of Japanese contract law in general, see
W. Shattuck and Z. Kitagawa, UNITEDSTATES-JAPANESE
CONTRACT
AND
SALEPROBLEMS
( I 973).
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liabiity for imperfect performance of contractual 0bligations,7~and
liability for latent product defects.77Imperfect performance liability
is contingent on the seller's negligence and as a result is not strict,
although the retailer is faced with displacing a presumption of negligence?' Contractual liability for latent defects, because it is strict,
is limited to the value of the damaged product itself," the popular
judicial view being that responsibility for consequential losses should
not be imposed in the absence of fault.
Imperfect performance liabiity is couched in terms of obligees
and obligors, and therefore applies only to contractual parties and
not to foreign manufacturers. There are two exceptions to this "privity" requirement which may be relevant to products liabiity risks.
The first permits the court, in addition to holding the retailer liable,
to subrogate the retailer's liability to the plaintiff against his distributor or manufacturer. This gives the plaintiff access to both parties?'
The other exception to the privity rule is judicial expansion of
contract so as to extend the defendant's contractual duty of care to
persons other than the actual purchaser who might reasonably be
expected to use the product?'
The potential contractual risks of Canadian manufacturers in the
Japanese domestic consumer market must be taken to be relatively
in~ignificant.'~As well, the extent of damage recovery for breach of
contract in Japanese law would seem to be consistent with that in
Art. 415: "If an obligor fails to effect performance in accordance
with the tenor and purport of the obligation, the obligee may demand compensation for damages."
Civil Code, A r t 570: "If any latent defects exist in the object of a sale,
the provisions of Article 566 shall apply mutatis mutandii.. ." Art. 566
provides that "Where the object of a sale is subject to.. [easement, pledge,
and the buyer was unaware thereof, he may rescind the contract
etc.]
only if the object of the contract cannot be attained thereby; in other cases
the buyer may demand only compensation for damages."
Fujita, supra, note 38, a t 163.
Damages for personal injuries are therefore not recoverable, and since in
most cases the value of the product itself relative to the injuries complained
of is immaterial, the imperfect obligation alternative is more attractive to an
injured consumer.
Article 423; Kamimaki v. Ohashi, Gifu District Court, Ogaki Branch, 307
Hanrei Taimuzu 87, 27 Dec. 1937 (The 'Egg-Tofu' Case). Where infected
egg-tofu caused the death of two people and the poisoning of over 400 others,
the manufacturer was held liable in tort, the retailer for imperfect performance, and the wholesaler by subrogation of the retaileis imperfect perfonnance claim against the wholesaler.
Id., where the heirs of the deceased (who had not purchased the product)
brought the action on behalf of themselves and the victims.
Niibori and Cosway, supra, note 52.

7e Civil Code,

77

...

7'
70

80

81
82

.

.
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Canadian
While the relaxation of the privity doctrine and
the subrogation rights against manufacturers would seem to broaden
contractual products liability risks in the case of Japanese consumers,
there is no evidence in the responses from manufacturers in our
survey that this risk is perceived as significant.

C. CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
In addition to facing potential civil liability in tort and contract
for negligence related to defective products, certain individualss'
within defendant organizations may be liable for criminal negligence
under Article 2 I I of the Criminal Code." This provision imposes
criminal liability where there is a violation of the duty of care
"required in the conduct of his [one's] profession or occupation".
Whether such criminal charges will be laid rests on the discretion of
the public prosecutor, the exercise of which, in turn, will most often
depend on the degree of negligence and the severity and frequency of
the injuryP6 As in cases of civil liability, the duty of care imposed
on an individual will vary with the inherent danger of the product
and will be particularly high in the production of potentially highrisk products such as food and
While criminal liability will
not usually develop from the typical product liability case in Japan,
the risk certainly exists.
In light of the limited data on the criminalization of manufacturing enterprises in the cases of products liability suits in Canadass as
83

85
86

87

H. T. Ricks, A Comparison of the Scope of Contract Damages in the United
States and Japan (1978) 12 INT'L
LAWYER105, at 107, 130.
The defendant will usually be the person actually in charge of the negligent
process and not the person only nominally in charge, such as directors or
presidents. I n Japan v. Hayasaka, Sendai High Court, 846 Hanrei Jiho 43,
10 Feb. 1977, a factory chief was acquitted but the manufacturing supervisor
directly in charge was convicted. I n 1970, the Japanese Automobile Consumers' Union attempted to persuade the National Police Agency to charge
Honda with criminal offences ranging from negligent manslaughter to attempted murder, relating to design defects in the Honda No. 360 subcompact. See H. Otake, Corporate Power in Social Conflict: Vehicle Safety
and Japanese Motor Manufacturers (1982) 10 INT.
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
OF LAW75, at 83-84.
Criminal Code, Law No. 45, 1907.
Niibori and Cosway, supra, note 52, a t 488-89.
Japan v. Hayasaka, supra, note 84. The court held that because the product
was intended for consumption by infants, forseeability of injury constitutes
the slightest anxiety, however vague or uncertain, about the safety of the
ingredients.
We are unaware of any reported Canadian cases involving criminal liability
for defective consumer products. The American experience is similar, although the Ford Pinto and Maverick cases are well known. See M. E.
Wheeler, Product Liability, Civil or Criminal- The Pinto Litigation (1981)
17 FORUM250.

Heinonline - - 19 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 334 1985

19~5

JAPANESE PRODUCT SAFETY

335

well as in Japan, it would be presumptuous to compare the risks
faced by manufacturers in the domestic Canadian market and the
Japanese export market. Our impression would be that the risks in
b o a cases would be marginal, and are unlikely to influence export
decisions.

I n assessing the relative risks faced by manufacturers exporting to
Japan, one must be cognizant of the existence of state insurance
programs which may result in the externalization of costs to the
Japanese consumer-ta~payer.'~Perhaps because of perceived inadequacies in the ability of tort law to provide compensation for victims
of particular classes of accident, the Japanese government has made
efforts to implement a number of compulsory insurance programs?'
These programs have been designed to ensure compensation for injured consumers and to shift their losses to those who may be in a
better financial posititon to bear them, such as suppliers, employers
and the state. Products liability risks to which foreign importers
must respond may be significantly altered by these public insurance
or compensation schemes. In cases where contributions to the fund
are not required, the consumer will still be compensated and the
manufacturer will escape liability costs completely. On the other
hand if mandatory contributions by all manufacturers, both foreign
and domestic, constitute the source of the insurance scheme's funds,
then the manufacturer faces a present, fixed cost which replaces the
future, uncertain cost of a damage award against him and may be
less than or greater than that future cost, depending on the insurer's
ability to assess the particular risk represented by this manufacturer's
activities.
Under Japanese workers' compensation law91 employees who are
injured by a defective machine in their work environment can, after
recovery of worker compensation scheme benefits, sue the negligent
employer for any additional damage?' The court in this case may
decide on joint and several liability of the employer and the manu89
90

01

A LEGALAND ECONOMIC
See G. Calabresi, TBE COSTSOF ACCIDENTS:
ANALYSIS( Ig70), at 248-49.
For a detailed discussion of the justifications of these plans with particular
emphasis on drug related injuries, see J. Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation
Plans (1982) 30 Anr. J. COMP.LAW297.
Workmen's Accident Compensation Insurance Act (WACIA), Law No. 50,
1947. See Kitagawa, supra, note 38, Vol. 6, Part XII, Ch. 2 for a summary
of the relevant law-
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facturer. It is only if there is no fault on the part of the employer
that the employee may consider suing the manufacturer of the defective machine for additional damages. This is unlikely since most
Japanese collective labour agreements apparently contain a clause
establishing a right of recovery of such damages from the employer.93
It is clear that where worker compensation benefits are paid out to
an injured employee, the products liability costs for foreign as well
as domestic manufacturers of defective machines and tools are significantly reduced. The Japanese "no fault" automobile insurance
schemes4has a similar impact on manufacturers of defective vehicles
or automobile parts. The Automobile Indemnification Guarantee
Acts5 imposes strict liability on the owner-operator of a vehicle involved in an automobile accident, and since minimum private insurance is compulsory, the private insurer must bear the loss or seek
indemnification from the manufacturers6
In addition to these public insurance funds which socialize risk in
certain sectors of Japanese society, compensation schemes are also
common in Japan. These schemes are funded by mandatory contributions from manufacturers and are designed to provide compensation for injuries caused by specific products. For example, under
the Consumer Products Safety Act:? an association is charged with
the procurement of products liability insurance for all products
granted the 'SG' mark." The insurance is funded through the proceeds from fees paid by manufacturers for mandatory safety stickers.
Compensation awards up to a maximum of twenty million yens9 per
person are paid where the association determines that the manufacturer is legally liable. The Drug Side Effects Injuries Relief Fund
92

93

95
96

97
98

99

A 1980 amendment to the WACIA introduced a set-off provision between
WCI Pension Benefits and civil damages. WACIA, Art. 67 (Law No. 104,
1g80), effective I Dec. 1981.
Kitagawa, supra, note 38, a t 4-27.
A summary of these plans is contained in W. Shimeall, No-Fault Auto Insurance: T h e Japanese Experience ( I 973) g F o ~ u a r771.
Law No. 97, 1955, Art. 3.
According to Kitagawa, this type of case is rarely reported: supra, note 38,
a t 4-28.
Law No. 31, 1973.
While this mark is often compared with the Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval, the similarities are not as compelling as they might first appear.
The significance which is attached to this type of standard by a very large
percentage of Japanese consumers is unparalleled in North America. See text
accompanying notes I 5 I -6 I.
This figure is for 1982.
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Actloo also depends on mandatory manufacturers' contributions
which are assessed in proportion to sales, and are partially dependent
on a risk rate. The maximum benefit awarded is considerably below
the expected tort damages awards because of the exclusion of nonpecuniary loss and the limitation on compensation for economic
loss.101
Canadian manufacturers enjoy similar benefits under provincial
health care insurance programs and worker compensation programs
to the extent that the ex ante contributions to the scheme do not
coincide with actual expected accident costs, and to the extent
that Canadian compensation programs do not contemplate cost recovery through exercise of subrogation rights. Again, empirical evidence as to the relative degree to which public insurance and compensation programs will externalize costs is lacking, although even
this perfunctory assessment suggests that the Canadian manufacturer
may benefit from his export decisions in the case of specific products.

The liability of a foreign enterprise may arise in several contexts,
~vhichwill have a direct effect on the probability of a lawsuit being
brought, and the probability of a successful claim being pursued.
First, the importer to Japan (although controlled by a foreign enterprise) may itself be a Japanese legal entity. Second, the foreign
enterprise may itself be named as a foreign litigant in defence of an
action by a Japanese consumer. Third, a domestic enterprise or distributor may seek to protect itself from liability by joining the foreign
manufacturer in the products liability suit. Whatever the relationship
of the parties, the potential liability of foreign based manufacturerdefendants will be directly affected by certain procedural constraints
which reduce the likelihood of successful litigation. These include
the jurisdiction of the Japanese court, the choice of law, and the
availability of evidence to the plaintiff in the preparation of her
case.
The general rules regarding the jurisdiction of a Japanese court
are found in Articles I and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These
sections provide that the defendant's domicile102is determinative, but
100 Law

No. 68, 1979.
Presently $7,000 for a personal injury pension and $6,160 for a bereaved
family pension: Fleming, supra, note go, at 43.
102 Article 21 defines domicile as "the principal place of living".
101
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that where the domicile is not in Japan or cannot be determined, the
defendant's residence shall prevail. Thus it appears that the jurisdictional issue will often be determined in favour of the foreign
enterprise. There are, however, several subsidiary rules which may
alter this result. Where the defendant is a foreign corporation or
association, its usual forum is considered to be the place of its "office,
place of business or person in charge of the affairs thereof in
Japan".los With respect to tort claims, the Code of Civil Procedure
permits an action to be brought "before the court of the place where
the act was committed".lM This has been interpreted judicially to
mean either the place of the tortious conduct or the place where the
injury occurred.lo5As most products liability claims will be articulated as tort claims, this is perhaps the most significant provision
under which the Japanese court may assume jurisdiction. Where
the products liability claim is expressed as a contract claim, the
consumer-plaintiff's residence usually determines the forum.loGIn
view of the Code's provisions there is a significant possibility that at
least some Japanese consumer-plaintiffs will be forced to sue in
Canada if they are to recover compensation. The costs of transnational litigation are apt to be substantial.
Once it is determined that the Japanese court will assume jurisdiction over the foreign enterprise, the court must then determine
which national substantive law will apply to determine liability: the
law of the defendant's jurisdiction (that is, Canada) or the substantive law of Japan. An injury occurring in Japan will generally give
Code of Civil Procedure, A r t 4, par. 3. Note that Article 429 of the Commercial Code requires that any corporation doing continuous business in
Japan establish an office and representative in Japan. Article 4 has been
invoked even where the office was relatively t e m p o r q and informal. George
v. International Air Service Co. Tokyo District Court, 16 Rodo Reishu 308,
26 April 1965. The strictness of the rule is apparently tempered through
application of discretionary principles which provide for its relaxation where
"justice and reason" call for an alternative forum. Y. Nomura, Japanese
Court Jurisdiction in Transnational Litigation ( I 984) 3 I OSAKAUNN. L.
REV.21, at 30-33.
104 Id., Art. 15.
105 For example, Japanese victims of an airplane crash who alleged defects in
the design of the aircraft brought suits in Japan against the American
manufacturers: Yabutani v. The Boeing Company, Tokyo District Court,
754 HANREIJIHO 58, 24 July 1974, translated in (1975) 19 JAP. ANNUAL
OF INT'L
LAW 225. See generally A. Gotoh, Products Liability and InterOF INT'L
LAW15.
national Jurisdiction (1977) 2 1 JAP. ANNUAL
106 Article 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure grants jurisdiction to "the court
situated in the place of performance" of the duty which, in Japan, is taken
to mean the duty to pay damages for breach of contract. See generally
Dicey and Morris, THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS(10th ed. 1980), a t 209.
103
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rise to the application of Japanese tort law?07 Moreover, even where
foreign law is applicable, if the events in question do not constitute
a tort under Japanese law, Japanese law will apply to absolve the
defendant from liability notwithstanding that foreign law may impose legal responsibility?08 Thus where foreign liabiity is strict but
where the parallel Japanese liability is fault-based, fault must be
established.
The liability of a foreign manufacturer is also affected by evidentiary rules which may operate to its advantage. In Japan there is no
parallel to the Canadian interrogatory or discovery procedures
by which evidence can be obtained prior to trial under the authority
of la1v?09 Apart from the office of the public prosecutor:'O
cmly the
Japanese court has the authority to demand the production of evidence? and a foreign party must therefore enlist its assistance to
do so. The Japanese court will render its assistance only when officially requested by the foreign state:12 and this process can take up
to a full year to complete?13 Even where the Japanese court does
exercise its authority, non-disclosure privileges granted by the Code
of Civil Pr~cedure"~
are substantial, particularly in the area of inLaw concerning the Applications of Laws in General, Law No. 10, 1898,
Art. I I. Para. I provides that tort disputes should be "governed by the law
of the place where the facts forming the cause of such obligation have
occurred". Although this provision is unclear, academic and judicial opinion
suggest this interpretation. See also Kitagawa, supra, note 38, a t Part XIV,
5-64; Toho K.K. v. Hachisuka Tokyo District Court, 16 Kaminshu 923,
27 May 1965. Admittedly, Japanese law relating to international products
claims is not well-developed. See Gotoh, supra, note 105, a t I 7, I 9.
108 Id., A r t I I, par. 2.
lm Kitagawa, supra, note 38, at Part XIV, 5-93; Fujita, supra, note 38, at
174-75110 Fujita, id. Only the office of the Public Prosecutor has the power to take
compulsory depositions and to subpoena evidence.
111 See Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 271 on examination of witnesses, and A r t
314 on the production of documents.
11' Kitagawa, supra, note 38, a t Part XIV, 5-103. This is usually accomplished
by 'Letters Rogatory' and carries a number of conditions including the provision of a detailed list of questions and a guarantee of reciprocity from the
foreign state.
113 Id., a t 5-104.
1" Under Articles 280 and 281 a witness may refuse to testify where i t may
lead to criminal prosecution or disgrace for himself, his family or his employees, or where it relates to technical or professional secrets. Under Article
312, the holder of a document may refuse to produce it except where he has
referred to i t in litigation, where the person demanding it has a right to it,
or where the document establishes a legal relation between the parties.
Under Article 313, the person demanding the document must first set out
its nature and the fact to be proved by i t
107
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dustrial secrets, and thus an effort to obtain pre-trial evidence will
be expensive and may prove to be fruitless. These restrictions on
pre-trial access to information seriously prejudice the establishment
of a products liability claim and present the most difficult hurdle for
a plaintiff in the Japanese legal system.
In addition, the plaintiff in most products liability cases in Japan
will usually be acting as an individual. Japanese law does not contemplate representative class actions, and thus formal collective action and the benefits of representative products liability suits are not
possible. Procedural rules require that the individuals be enumerated in the statement of claim, and that the representative must be
chosen by and from the group.''' Moreover, the size of the group
is limited by jurisdictional rules which require, in the case of tort
claims, that a plaintiff bring hi action in one of two forums: either
the place where the injury occurred or the place where the unlawful
act was committed.l16 As most widespread injuries will occur across
a number of jurisdictions, an all-inclusive plaintiff group is only possible if the claim is brought in the jurisdiction where the act was
committed and this, of course, would reduce the convenience and
increase the cost of a group action. It should be noted, however,
that collective plaintiff groups may be organized which may nevertheless achieve essentially the same result by less formal means. In
multiple injury cases it is not uncommon for victims to form associations through which the preparation of the case can be managed
and pursuant to which the defendant is encouraged to settle the
claims out of court.l17

.From even this cursory examination of Japanese products liability
law it is possible to draw the following general conclusions:
(1) The non-litigious behaviour of Japanese consumers makes the
Articles 46 and 47 permit representation in bringing or defending a suit to
groups or associations not having the status of juridical persons, and Articles
59-63 govern co-litigants. If the group members are not enumerated in the
statement of claim as co-litigants under Article 59, then a representative
must be chosen and hi authority certified in writing pursuant to Article 52.
116 For example, in the SMON litigation, decisions were rendered in nine different district courts. Terms of Settlement, supra, note 65, at 102. Similarly,
the Kanemi Yusho cooking oil disaster was resolved in three separate trials.
See Reich, supra, note 59, a t 106, 109.
117 Again, in the SMON litigation, the victims were represented by a t least
twenty patient groups with a national liaison council. See Terms of Settlement, id., a t 99-1 17. See Reich, id.
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probability of a products liability claim being brought against
the Canadian exporter relatively small.
The probability of pursuit or success of a products liability claim
against the Canadian manufacturer is greatly reduced by the
absence of a discovery process resulting in the Japanese consumer being confronted with formidable evidentiary problems.
The use of risk-utility analysis by the Japanese courts may mean
that, unless there is evidence of widespread injury caused by a
specific Canadian product, the existence of a defect and causation may be difficult to prove.
Canadian manufacturers do not face strict contractual liability
in Japan (in respect of liability for personal injury and property damagells), while manufacturers producing for the Canadian market may in certain provinces and circumstances11s be
held strictly liable to compensate for injuries caused by defective
goods.
Canadian companies may benefit from the joining of the Japanese government as a defendant in products liability cases.120
The state may be jointly and severally liable with the manufacturer. While a finding of negligent state approval or inspection
does not absolve the manufacturer, it will usually reduce the
cost of liability."l
Canadian exporting manufacturers face products liability darnage awards which as a general matter, and at least on a comparative basis, are significantly lower than those faced in
Canada.122

By the Act Concerning the Applications of Laws, Art. I I, even if foreign
law is applicable to the particular products liability claim, if the events do
not constitute a tort under Japanese law, then the latter applies. Thus if
foreign liability is strict, and Japanese liability is fault based, fault must
always be established.
1 x 9 I n Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, consumers can sue manufacturers
directly to recover compensation for personal injury and property damage
resulting from a breach of implied contractual obligations relating to product
quality. Consumer Products Warranties Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-go, s. 11;
Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, s. 12.
It is also possible for a consumer to recover compensation without proof
of negligence from a manufacturer based upon express statements contained
in informational material distributed by him. Murray v. Sperry Rand Corporation (1979) 23 O.R. (2d) 456 (ONT. H.C.); Naken v. General Motors
of Canada Ltd. (1978) 2 I O.R. (2d) 7 8 0 ~ 9 2D.L.R. (3d) roo (ONT.C.A.),
appeal allowed on other grounds [1983] I S.C.R. 72, 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385.
120 The State Redress Act, Art. I grants compensation for intentional or negligent harm inflicted by a civil servant in the course of his duties. I t should
be noted that state liability is secondary in nature.
121 I n both the thalidomide and SMON litigation, the government was held
responsible for approximately one third of the damage awards.
12 I n the thalidomide litigation, the average award was $133,ooo per child,
$13,000 for parents and $13,ooo for legal fees. I n The Kanemi Cooking Oil
Case, supra, note 62, the average award from a manufacturers' compensation
fund for skin and kidney diseases was $70,000.
118
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These conclusions are confirmed by an analysis of products liability insurance behaviour by enterprises in Japan. In general, Japanese
firms do not appear to consider this type of insurance to be essential.
In 1977, only 24% of Japanese manufacturers carried this variety
of coverage despite the fact that this protection is relatively inexpensive.lZ3This contrasts with their American counterparts, 86% of
whom subscribe to products liability insurance?24In addition, products liability insurance appears to be of negligible concern to Canadian manufacturers who are considering exporting to Japan?"
These observations reflect a situation where both the degree of risk
and the magnitude of loss associated with the occurrence of products
liability claims may be so low as to justify a company selling in the
Japanese market dispensing with products liability insurance altogether. That is, whether societal norms discourage litigation, whether
the legal system itself precludes access to the court system, or
whether even successful products liability claims represent relatively
minor costs, manufacturers marketing potentially defective products
in Japan can expect less serious legal consequences than their Japanese counterparts in most cases can expect in North America.
In summary, a Canadian manufacturer considering the Japanese
market is not likely to perceive products liability risks as a major
deterrent to
especially in comparison with other potential
markets such as the United States or the European Economic Community where the risks associated with defective products are per123

Economic Planning Board, PRODUCTS
LIABILITYAND THE BURDENOF COMPENSATION FOR INJURY
(1980), cited in Adachi, supra, note 38, a t 60. The
cost of this coverage ranges from -01% to 3% of gross sales and insurance
companies offer it a t a loss in order to compete for other insurance business.

U.S.Department of Commerce, Final Report of the Industry Study, INTERTASK
FORCEON PRODUCT
LIABILITY(vol. I, 1977), at IV-25. The
report also indicates that the average cost was .281% of gross sales in 1976,
at IV-33. According to an informal survey undertaken by the Ontario Law
Reform Commission in 1978, the cost of products liability insurance in
Canada was approximately .5% of gross sales in 1976. Ontario Law Reform
LIABILITY( I 979), a t 72.
Commission, REPORTON PRODUCT
125 The responses to the authors' questionnaire presented two common scenarios.
I n some cases, the firm's previous insurance policy covered its products
worldwide, while in other cases the company indicated that the perceived
risk of Japanese products liability claims was insufficient to warrant a new
or extended policy to cover Japanese exports.
126 This conclusion was confirmed by the responses in questionnaires received
from Canadian manufacturers. I n fact, the low products liability costs are
an attractive feature of the Japanese market for Canadian firms exporting
there.
AGENCY
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This perception of litigation risks acceived to be more
knowledges that regulation of product quality in Japan is carried
out by a mixture of formal and informal prospective controls by the
state, and by ex post tort litigation designed to internalize social costs
with an emphasis on the former regulatory tool. Most societies, including Canada and Japan, have chosen a mixture of the two methods. Yet one cannot stress too heavily the dramatic difference in the
relative balance between the methods which have been adopted in
Japan, as compared to that in Canada or the United States. As
recently as 1967 a comprehensive study of Japan products liability
law uncovered no products liability lawsuits against Japanese retailers and wholesalers.128
This is not to say that Canadian manufacturers can anticipate
escaping substantial adverse commercial, social and market consequences if they export defective or dangerous goods to Japan. ConsiderabIy different values are at play in Japan with respect to both
commercial and private dealings. Western business enterprises may
be faced with consistent and pervasive expectations of Japanese consumers, commercial agents, and even state officials, to assume voluntarily responsibility for their shortcomings in situations where we
might very well assume that legal coercion would be both adequate
and appr~priate.'~~

IV. JAPANESE STANDARDS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE

A technical standard may be defined as any law, regulation, specification or other requirement with respect to the properties of a
product or the manner, condition or circumstances under which a
See Committee on Consumer Policy, SAFETYOF CONSUMER
PRODUCTS:
POLICYAND LEGISLATION
IN OECD MEMBER
COUNTRIES
(1980)~a t 50;
H. Tebbens, INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCT
LIABILITY: A STUDYOF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
LEGALASPECTSOF PRODUCT
LIABILITY (1979).
For a discussion of the insurance practices of Canadian manufacturers exporting to "strict liability" markets, see P. Halpern and J. Carr, Consumer
and Corporate Affairs Canada, LIABILITY
RULESAND INSURANCE
MARKETS
(1981)~a t 22, 70-71.
Niibori and Cosway, supra, note 52.
129 In some of the multiple injury cases (see supra, notes 48, 53, and 59),
out-of-court settlements provided for the establishment of foundations which
handled the health care, educational, and employment problems of the victims. See also P. Lansing and M. Wechselblatt, Doing Business in Japan:
The Importance of the Unwritten Law (1983) 17 INT'L
LAWYER647, at
653. Kitigawa says, however, that the consumer's filing of a products liability
suit provided a "strong impetus" for the manufacturer to agree to such a
settlement: supra, note 38, a t 4-38.
m7
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product is produced or marketed.130 While compliance with standards may not be mandatory under Japanese law, it may nonetheless be advisable because of a consumer preference for goods that
display a mark known to them to represent an acceptable level of
quality or safety. Sometimes standards and associated certification
marks provide the consumer with information by assuring him that
goods conform to a certain level of quality or safety.13' In addition,
they may permit him to make comparisons of products manufactured
domestically and abroad.13' Thus, standards not only serve a consumer protection purpose, but also reduce information search costs,
and facilitate the exchange of goods in the marketplace by promoting their inter~hangeability.'~~
Despite these trade facilitating effects, standards may also adversely influence the movement of goods across national borders.
Since standards may be tailored to domestic technical experience
and expertise, and to domestic consumer and industrial needs, they
frequently have the effect of distorting international trade. A company that manufactures to its domestic standards will be at a
competitive disadvantage in a foreign market if a foreign state demands higher or even different standards. This may or may not be
the intended result, since it is the disparity in standards which is
responsible for this trade barrier. Whether the purpose of the standard is the protection of domestic industry or the promotion of a
legitimate domestic policy objective, and whether one standard is
perceived to be stricter than another is irrelevant to its impact on
trade. While international harmonization of standards appears to
be the underlying rationale of many international standards organizations and trade agreements, its complete realization is clearly an
unrealistic goal. There will always exist differing national values,
priorities and physical circumstances which make uniform international standards inappr~priate.'~~
See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 26th Supp.,
1979 (also referred to as the GATT Standards Code). For a detailed discussion of the rationale and effects of standards, see D. Lecraw (Economic
AS A REGULATORY
DEVICE:
Council of Canada), VOLUNTARY
STANDARDS
WORKING
PAPERNO. z3 (1981) ; R. Legget, STANDARDS
IN CANADA
(1970).
'3'
See text accompanying notes 154-61 for a discussion of quality marks in the
Japanese market.
132 See Legget, supra, note 130, a t 201-og.
'33 Id., at 209-23.
'34 Sweeney, supra, note zg, a t 186. The Preamble to the Standards Code recognizes the right of a country to enact "measures necessary to ensure the
130
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In addition, the standards setting process may adversely affect
international trade. Imports may be reduced where there is inadequate information respecting standards available to foreign manufacturers, where insufficient notice of regulatory standard reform is
given to foreign enterprises, or where foreign companies are not
formally represented on committees which promulgate standards, or
cannot participate effectively in informal business-government relationships. Finally, procedures which implement standards such as
testing, certification, and labelling and packaging requirements may
operate as obstacles to international trade.
For the foreign manufacturer, these difficulties related to standards represent costs which, although difficult to quantify, will affect
the price or profitability of its product in a foreign market. These
costs may take numerous forms, including search costs, costs of
testing and certification
changing design or production
fees, or delay costs. The result may be a loss of competitive advantage since domestic manufacturers which need to satisfy only one
standard may take advantage of economies of scale. Ultimately, as a
result of these trade-restricting effects, the market can expect a
decrease in imports, and a concomitant increase in the price of remaining imports,ls6 or perhaps in the price of domestic goods.
If international trade negotiations are to progress, it must be
determined whether the operation of particular standards as trade
impediments can be considered fair and legitimate; that is, whether
they are to be classified as protecti~nistl~~
or rather are to be assessed
quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, of the environment., or for the prevention of deceptive practices", or
"for the protection of its essential security interest".
13Wanufacturers may find i t more profitable not to make this type of change,
but rather may choose to modify and reconstruct the final product to comply
with the standards of a particular export market. Costs may nevertheless
still be significant. For example, i t is estimated that tear-down and reconstruction of American automobiles in Japan to meet various standards requirements (such as emission standards) adds over $1,000 to the price of
each vehicle: TASK
FORCE
REPORT(1g7g), supra, note 7, a t 29-30.
138 Id. The price of the Volkswagen Golf apparently increases by one third as a
result of 41 Japanese technical regulations: Hohe Hiirden fur Importautos,
Die Zeit, 29 May 1981, cited in J. Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements
on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in International and
EEC Perspcctiue (1982) 19 Coar. MKT. L. h v . 5, at note 7.
137 This assumes that trade barriers which have as their sole purpose the protection of domestic industry are undesirable as unnecessary impediments to
the free flow of international trade. Inherent in thii position is an assumption, or perhaps an objective, that uncompetitive domestic industries should
be abandoned, and resources should be reallocated to industries that are
competitive internationally. According to some economists this would result
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as economically or culturally justified domestic policies. In the next
section we present a simplified and generalized outline of the most
common standards barriers which have been encountered by North
American business enterprises in attempting to do business in Japan.
It should be borne in mind that this area is rapidly changing and
numerous recent Japanese trade liberalization measures have already
had a significant impact on specific industries and

A foreign manufacturer's first contact with the Japanese product
standards system traditionally occurred when import approval was
sought. In order to ensure at an early stage that potential imports
met the requisite standards, the Japanese government required detailed and comprehensive disclosure of all pertinent information on
approval applications,l40 which often had to be accompanied by a
product sample. Inaccurate information had serious results: a cosmetics company that mistakenly wrote "annex" instead of "head
office" on its application was ordered by Japanese customs officials
to recall all of its lipstick cases from the market."' In addition, import applications were required to be submitted through a resident
company, usually a Japanese trading company. Thus the foreign
exporter, even before his product entered the market, was faced
with trade barriers, as the disclosure requirements represent increased
costs and greater 1isks.1~'First, there was the possibility of delay
-.

-

-

in consumer savings, increased investment opportunity, technological innovation and lower inflation. See Cline, supra, note 36, at 6-7. See also Jackson, supra, note 16, a t 325.
13s See F. Coccodrilli, Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on Tech-

nical Barriers T o Trade: T h e United States-Japan Metal Bat Dispute
(1983-84) 7 FORD.INT'LL.J.137.
1 s To talk of a unitary Japanese standards system is perhaps misleading since
the various standards schemes regulating diierent products are obviously
administered by different private and governmental bodies, and in the latter
case are established under the authority of widely differing Acts, such as the
Road Vehicles Act, No. I 05 ( I 960), Electrical Appliances and Materials
Control Law, No. 234 (1961), and the Consumer Product Safety Law, No.
31 (1973). For a brief summary of the effect of these and other laws on
SYSTEM( I 978).
imports, see JETRO, JAPAN'S IMPORT
I* For example, a manufacturer may be required to provide a complete list of
ingredients, processing details or product test results.
Foreign Firms are Irked Over Needless Procedures, supra, note 18 ,at 3.
Another example is cited in which approval was denied where the spaces
between the figures in the production date (year, month, date) were too
wide.
142 See generally, C. Wunsch, Trade Secret Confidentiality and Toxic Substances Regulation: A Non-Tariff Trade Barrier in the Chemical Trade,
(1981) 14 CORN.INT'L
L.J. 173.

Heinonline - - 19 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 346 1985

1985

JAPANESE PRODUCT SAFETY

347

because of uncertainty about the sufficiency of the disclosed information. Second, there was the risk of proprietary information being
released to competito~sby Japanese authorities, resulting in a subsequent loss of market share.14=Third, the residency requirement
effectively committed a foreign exporter to a particular Japanese
agent, since witching import agents entailed reapplication for import approval with all of its associated costs.
A related problem for foreign manufacturers concerned the Japanese import classification system. The decision on the part of officials as to the classification of an imported product determined
which standards, quotas and duties (if any) were applicable, and
clearly affected the manufacturer's competitive position. These decisions sometimes appeared to be discriminatory in cases where a
product fell into several possible groups due to the existence of
overlapping classifications. For example, despite a commitment
made by the Japanese government to the international community
to remove duties on all automobile parts, some Canadian manufacturers of automobile windshields were obliged to pay duties because
their products were given more specific customs classifications such
as "laminated glass". Apparently, the more specific code prevailed
in such cases?"
If the exporter was successful in obtaining approval, his product
next had to be submitted to Japanese customs officials, at which
point there was also potential for costly delaysT5 For example, at
one time Canadian lumber was required to be inspected piece by
The danger for a foreign finn exporting to Japan is that its product may be
effectively barred from the market when its technology is released to competitors who may have lower production costs.
144 This problem was brought to our attention in one of the questionnaire
responses and was being investigated by the Canadian embassy in Tokyo,
during the summer of I 983.
A Canadian manufacturer of potato granules was faced with stringent
Japanese specifications to be met by their product until the Japanese officials
were convinced that there had been an incorrect classification, and that
potato flake standards were inappropriate for this particular product. See
I?. Weil and N. Glick, Japan -Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese Market Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience (1979) 11 LAW AND
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 845, a t 864-65 for a case in which reclassification of
potato chips resulted in an increase in duty from 16% to 35%.
1" Id., a t 864. An American manufacturer of electronic components found that
at Japanese Customs each control had to be disassembled, photographed,
and reassembled before it could be sold on the Japanese market. Of course,
Canadian bureaucrats have used similar tactics to impede the importation
of Japanese products. See Tighter Customs Inspections Slow Flow of l a p anese Cars, supra, note g.

143
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piece.lM I n addition, there has been some concern expressed by
Western exporters that standards and customs rules were capable
of being used at this stage to discourage "non-essential" imports in
the pursuit of other government policy objectives.14' At this time, as
a t the import approval stage, Japanese custom officials verified
whether the relevant Japanese standards had been complied with.
Although the specific standards regulations applicable to a particular
product depend upon its classificatiton, one can recognize several
common standards problems faced by foreign exporters both at the
approval stage and when the product passed through customs.
First, many Japanese standards regulated the design rather than
the performance characteristics of a product, making it possible for
goods to have performance attributes which were superior to those
of a corresponding conforming product, but making these goods
susceptible to rejection by Japanese officials because of minor differences in design.14' In order to penetrate the market it became
necessary for foreign companies to implement costly design and production technique changes. This factor has also had a negative effect
on product innovation because a manufactureis investments in
product improvements sometimes resulted in rejection of the product
by Japanese customs 0fficia1s.l~~
Another area of difficulty which often confronted exporters is the
Japanese "positive list" approach to harmful substances in food,
clothing, agricultural products, packaging, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals. Rather than maintaining a list of prohibited or restricted
substances, the Japanese government lists in its regulations those
This barrier has since been removed. See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs,
17 Feb. 1981, a t 38:8.
147 Several Canadian manufacturers contacted by the author expressed a concern that trade barriers to their particular product appeared particularly
insurmountable a t times when Japan had exchange problems. Decisions made
by low-level Japanese bureaucrats may be subject to review by the Office of
Trade Ombudsman, which was established by the Japanese as part of their
trade liberalization measures.
I* For example, an American electrical cord was barred from the Japanese
market because its strands were thicker than those making up cords manufactured to Japanese standards. T h e thickness was not related to performance. See Weil and Glick, supra, note 144, a t 866.
Similarly, American metal baseball bats were denied entry when the JSBB
(Japanese Rubberized Baseball League) established design standards relating to the alloy used in the bats and to the inclusion of rubber plugs in the
ends of the bats. See supra, note 138, a t 150. The use of design standards
may violate Art. 2.4 of the AGREEMENT
ON TECHNICAL
BARRIERS
TO TRADE,
supra, note 130.
149 Weil and Glick, supra, note I&.
146
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ingredients which are permitted, for which uses, and in what
amounts.150 If for example a new f w d product contains an additive
d
~e&lations,or if it contains an
not included in the ~ o o Sanitation
approved additive in larger amounts than permitted, it is denied
import approval, or is rejected at customs. If the foreign enterprise
can demonstrate that the additive is harmless, a procedure exists
pursuant to which approval may be granted afterseveral months.
These potential or actual delays sometimes necessitate more expensive production techniques to ensure product stability and longer
shelf life:51 and there is always an increased risk of product rejection.
These difficulties were joined by product certification barriers. As
a general rule, until the introduction of recent trade liberalization
measures, product testing to determine conformity to standards had
to be carried out in Japan, and foreign laboratory test data were
unacceptable;lJ2In addition, any modification to the product triggered re-certification problems. This peculiarity of the Japanese standards system clearly represented delays, risks and costs for the foreign
exporter, especially where standards were unavailable in English, or
when the reasons for rejection by the Japanese testing authority were
unarticulated. This barrier has been a source of considerable friction
in Japanese trade relations especially in view of the fact that many
Western countries generally accept foreign (Japanese) test
In addition, imports have explicitly or implicitly been denied acl ~ ~ example, the Japan
cess to various Japanese marks of q ~ a 1 i t y . For
Industrial Standard (JIS)155 mark of quality is awarded after testing
not merely samples of the product but also the plant, equipment,
See TASK
FORCEREPORT(1980)~supra, note 7, a t 31.
Canadian firm exporting cookies to Japan reported this experience in the
authors' survey.
1 5 2 \Veil and Glick, supra, note 144, a t 871-72. See Office of the U.S. Trade
ON THE AGREERepresentative, REPORTTO THE UNITEDSTATESCONGRESS
MENT ON TECHNICAL
BARRIERS
TO TRADE
-"STANDARDS
CODE" ( 1 9 8 3 ) ~
a t 21.
153 TASK
FORCEREPORT(1979)~supra, note 7, at 21. See text accompanying
notes 163-70 for a description of the trade liberalization measures in - this
context.
154 Jackson, supra, note 16, a t 327. Examples of Japinese certification marks are
JIS, JAS (Japan Agricultural Standard), SG or S. The latter bvo standards
indicate the product has been approved under the Consumer Products
Safety Act, Law No.'QI, 1973, and are mandatory for certain mariufactured
goods includingptessure cookers and baseball bats. The SG mark indicates
that the manufacturer participates in an insurance program established by
the Product Safety Association. See supra, note 138, a t 149.
155 See Lecraw, supra, note 130, Appendix B, a t 50-52.
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and quality control system of the manufacturer. While the mark is
voluntary (except where it is adopted as mandatory by legislati01-1'~~)~
the certification procedures have had the effect of denying
some foreign products the prestige and potential market power associated with the mark. Furthermore, imports have been excluded
from carrying an industry stamp of approval. Manufacturers of certain recreational equipment were effectively forced out of the Japanese market when national sports leagues refused to place their
stamps on foreign-made e q ~ i p m e n t ?Finally,
~~
Japanese processes
which set standards have posed serious problems to Western exporte r ~ For
? ~ example,
~
standards have been unavailable in English or
difficult to obtain;15' they have been changed without notice or with
insufficient notice given to foreign manufacturer^;^^^ and the standards-formation process has tradititonally been closed to foreigners.I6I
The conclusion one can draw from this analysis is that Japanese
product standards and certification procedures have undeniably
See, for example, the Electrical Appliance and Material Control Law. NO.
2349 1961157 Foreign manufacturers of products such as aluminum baseball bats, volleyballs and tennis balls have been victims of this practice: How the U.S.
Struck Out I n Japan, NEW YORKTIMES,
25 Oct. 1981, a t BI, col. I. But
see Baseball's Best Trade, BOSTONGLOBE,2 2 July 1983, at 30, which reports
a new agreement between the United States and Japan to permit export of
metal bats to Japan, reached after extended negotiations of government officials from both countries and manufacturers of bats. See supra, note 138,
a t 152-55.
I t is not clear if these barriers can be ascribed to the Japanese government's
deliberate decisions to exclude foreigners, or if language and distance explain
the inability of foreign businesses to participate effectively in the process.
159 See Weil and Glick, supm, note 144, a t 868. The responses to our questionnaire indicate that this is not a major problem for Canadian manufacturers
since standards which are not published in English by the Japanese government are usually translated into English by one of the Japanese trading
companies through which many Canadian companies export to Japan.
160 Id., a t 870. Domestic industry is often involved in the standards setting
process, thereby affording domestic manufacturers a temporal advantage
over foreign firms. For example, an American manufacturer introduced electric griddles in Japan in 1974. The following year, a new Japanese standard
set the temperature a t two degrees less than the capability of the American
brand. By the time notice was received and changes made in order for the
American product to comply, the market had been flooded with two million
units, most of which were made in Japan.
161 Recently some Japanese standards-setting bodies have been opened to permit foreign representation. I n 1978 the Japan Electrical Association allowed
American representatives to sit on its standards formulation and revision
committees. See M I T I (Overseas Public Relations Office), ILIPLEMENTATION OF THE IMPROVEMENT
IN JAPAN'S
STANDARDS
AND CERTIFICATION
S ~ s ~ ~ (13
n r Feb.
s
1984) ;MITI, STANDARDS
INFORMATION
NO. 4 (15 Feb.
19841, a t 1, 4.

156

Heinonline - - 19 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 350 1985

Ig85

JAPANESE PRODUCT SAFETY

35'

operated as barriers to trade. Moreover, unlike quotas and explicit
tariffs, non-tariff barriers may not be foreseeable, thus introducing
uncertainty into the intemational trade environment which is a major concern of exportersle2In addition, compliance costs entail expensive design and production technique modifications. This capital
investment would have had to have been absorbed by the foreign
manufacturer in cases where the domestic Japanese market was relatively competitive. Where these non-tariff costs were significant, the
market was effectively closed to the foreign exporter. Where uncertainty, increased costs and delays associated with Japanese standards
were foreseen, a manufacturer may simply have decided that the
diversion of capital and management resources over an extended
period would be unjustified. Thus a non-tariff standards barrier may
operate either as a tariff, increasing the price of imported goods by
an amount reflecting the costs and risks associated with meeting
Japanese standards, or as an absolute prohibition of the product
where the marginal costs associated with exporting to Japan and
meeting the standards exceed the expected marginal revenues associated with the export market.

In an attempt to reduce some of these standards baniers, Western
businesses and governments have demanded, in the context of bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the Japanese, that marketopening reforms be implemented. In response, a series of trade liberalization measures have been announced by the Japanese which
are designed to reduce the trade baniers to varying degrees depending upon the industry in question.
In January of 1980, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (usually referred to as the GATT Standards Code)? to
which both Canada and Japan are signatories, came into effect. The
primary object of the Code is to reduce the number of unnecessary
standards obstacles to international trade. At the same time, the
Code recognizes domestic sovereignty of each nation to enact legitimate measures "necessary. . for the protection of human, animal
or plant life or health or the
The Code encourages

.

Supra, note 146, at 38:5.
Supra, note 130. See R. Middleton, The GATT Standards Code (1980) 14
J. WORLD
TRADE
LAW201 ;Sweeney, supra, note 29.
164 Standards Code, supra, note 130 at art. 2.2.
162

163
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the use of international standards,165the promulgation of performance rather than design standards,166the provision of notice and
comment to foreign enterprises in standards setting processes (transparency provisions) 7 the acceptability of foreign test data,'=' and
access to certification systems.lW While the traditional standards
structure in Japan is frequently criticized as being in contravention
of Japan's GATT obligations, it is fair to say that the Standards
Code has been relied upon by the West to only a limited degree to
influence the Japanese government to reduce its standards barriers.
The general language in which the exemption of permissible standards is couched, and the absence of an effective enforcement machinery, have placed in question the obligatory nature of the Code's
Nevertheless, recent Japanese import promotion measures indicate that the Japanese government views seriously its responsibilities
under the Standards Code.171 For example, amendments to the industrial standardization law, which provides access to the JIS marking system to foreigners, were made in April 1980.'~~
More recently,
the first general reduction of non-tariff barriers occurred in April

165

Id., art.

166

Id., art. 2.4.
Id., art. 10.

'67

2.2,

art. 2.3.

Id., art. 5.2.
Id., art. 7.2.
1 7 0 A. Blair, Prospects for Implementation of the GATT Standards Agreement
in the United States (1980) 2 0 VA. J. INT'L
L. 699; Bourgeois, supra, note
136, a t 5.
Nonetheless, the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Code have proved
effective in some circumstances. It is simply too early to determine if the
legislative reforms carried out by the Japanese under the Code will be
followed by complementary regulatory and administrative reforms. See supra,
note 138.
1 7 1 See GATT Chief Both Defends and Chides Japan Amid Trade Friction,
THEJAPAN ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, 30 March 1982, at 4.
172 See REPORTOF THE JAPAN-UNITED
STATESECONOMIC
RELATIONSGROUP,
supra, note 14,. at 60. The mark is now awarded to foreign products and
domestic goods without apparent discrimination. I n both cases the criteria
for the grant of the mark include the inspection and assessment of the quality
control procedures a t the factory where the goods are manufactured and the
maintenance and testing of facilities by an agency authorized by the Minister. The increased costs of foreign enterprise review continue to be an
effective barrier. On at least one occasion, the Americans have argued successfully for the introduction of "self-certification" procedures. See supra,
note 138, a t 138.

168
169
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and May of 1983T3 and the second occurred in April 1 9 8 4 1 ~ ~
Under these measures, several legislative and administrative reforms
have been adopted to support the Code's objectives, including the
adoption of a system which permits acceptance of certain test data
outside Japan;175 the direct application for testing in Japan by
foreign companies;176 simplified approval procedure^;'^^ approval
of foreign laboratories for inspection and certification purposes;178
gradual conformity of many Japanese standards with international
The Law to Amend a Part of the Related Laws to Facilitate the Obtaining
of Type Approval, etc. by Foreign Manufacturers, 20 April 1983. See Japan
Closer to Easing Import Curbs, THEGLOBEAND MAIL, 25 March 1983, at
OF JAPAN'S
STANB6, C O ~ . 5; MITI (Information Office), IMPROVEMENT
DARDS AND CERTIFICATION
Sysmars (13 May 1983).
This package of reform measures included the revision of seventeen laws
to provide for non-discriminatory treatment of foreign manufacturers and
the introduction of administrative reforms relating to standard drafting processes, internationalization of standards, acceptance of foreign test data and
simplification of certification procedures.
174 At the time of writing only a provisional translation of External Economic
Measures announced by MITI on 27 April 1984 had been published. See
infra, note 175. (On file, University of British Columbia, Faculty of Law.)
175 On 15 February 1984, MITI released detailed information describing the
procedures pursuant to which foreign test data would be accepted by the
Japanese government. The procedures, which are still complex, permit foreign manufacturers to participate on standards setting committees and permit certain test data generated by foreign enterprises to be submitted to the
relevant Japanese authorities. These procedures were further amplified in
MITI (Standards Information Centre), Standards Information No. 5 (26
April 1984) which set out the specific laws for which foreign test data will
be accepted and the guidelines for designation of foreign certification laboratories.
These measures were part of a broader program of tariff and non-tariff
reduction measures announced by the Japanese government. See H. Okonogi
(MITI), JAPAN EXTERNAL
ECONOMIC
MEASURES
(27 April I 984). On I I
June 1984 Applied Research Laboratories in the United States was named a
Designated Foreign Inspection Body under Japan's Electrical Appliances
and Material Control Law. See MITI, STANDARDS
INFORDIA~ON
NO. 9:
U.S. TESTING
INSTITUTION NAMED ' ~ E S I G N A T E DFOREIGNINSPECTION
BODY"UNDER JAPAN'S ELECTRICAL
APPLIANCES
AND MATERWLS
CONTROL
LAW( I I June I 984).
1 7 6 MITI, STANDARDS
INFORMATION
NO. 7: REGISTRATION
OF DIMPLEX
HEATING LTD. OF GREAT
BRITAINBY DIRECTACCESSIN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE
ELECTRICAL
APPLIANCES
AND MATERIAL
CONTROL
LAW (26 April 1984);
MITI, STANDARDS
INFORMATION
NO. I I : REGISTRATION
OF S.A. SEB. OF
FRANCE
BY DIRECTACCESS
IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CONSUMER
PRODUCT
SAFETYLAW (I9 July 1984).
177 The inspection procedure for subsequent similar shipments of a product has
been streamlined considerably, thereby cutting costly delays.
1 7 8 MITI, STANDARDS
INFORMATION
NO. 12 : UL WAS APPROVED AS A FOREIGN
INSPECTION
BODYUNDER THREE JAPANESE LAWSBY MITI (14 Aug. 1984) ;
MITI, STANDARDS
INFORMATION
NO. 8: APPROVAL
OF A FOREIGN
INSPECTION INSTITUTE
UNDER JIS LAW-THE SINGAPORE
INSTITUTE
OF STANDARDS OF INDUSTRIAL
RESEARCH
(SISIR) WAS APPROVED AS AN "APPROVED
INSPECTIONINSTITUTE"
(2 May I 984).
173
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standards;17' the implementation of an after-permit examination
customs system;lsOthe introduction of a centralized customs classification system; and the opening of standards drafting committees to
foreigners.''' In a measure specific to Canada-Japan trade, the Canadian Standards Association in 1981 reached an agreement with
the Japan Electrical Testing Laboratory pursuant to which certain
Canadian products can be tested and certified in Canada to have
met Japanese standards. The Japanese Electrical Testing Laboratory
will utilize the certificate along with the test report issued by the
Canadian Standards Association to simplify its testing practice in
accordance with the Rules of Utilization of Test Data by Foreign
Testing Bodies approved by the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry.lS2
In addition, the Japanese government has reduced tariffs on over
1700 mined and manufactured products a full year in advance of
the schedule agreed upon at the MTN Tokyo Round.- Tariffs on
agricultural, forestry and marine products are also to be reduced in
1985, one year earlier than scheduled. These reductions are to take
effect "providing that other leading nations do the same in implementing their own advanced reductions.'y1w What remains to be
seen is whether these tariff and non-tariff liberalization measures
Where international standards exist, as in the case of International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards, International Commission on Rules
for Approval of Electrical Equipment (CEE) standards, International Standard Organization (ISO) standards or FAO/WHO Committee Evaluations
of Food Additives, the government has committed itself to attempt conformity. Where no such standards exist the government will participate in
international standards-setting bodies. There has already been considerable
relaxation of Japanese automobile standards in order to conform with E.E.C.
and North American standards. See Transport Ministry to Publicize Simplified Car Import Procedures - The Japanese Market is Open to Foreign
Autos, THEJAPAN ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, 14 Feb. 1984, at 10. See also MITI,
STANDARDS
INFORMATION
NO. 6: JAPAN JOINSTHE CERTIFICATION
SYSTEBI
OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COBIMISSION
FOR CONFORMI'IY
CERTIFICATION
(27
April I 984).
180 This system allows examination of documents for the purposes of duty assessment to be made after the goods are released from customs custody.
181 Supra, note 16I . See also MITI, STANDARDS
INFORAIA
NO.
~ O10:
N 1984
OF NEW AND REVISEDDRAFTSOF
FISCALYEARPLANFOR PREPARATION
JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL
STANDARDS
(JIS) (27 June 1984). I n addition, the
comment period for such government bodies has been extended from 45 to
72 days.
182 Supra, note 10, at 20.
183 Supra, note I 74.
18.4 Id.
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will result in a truly open Japanese market, or indeed whether additional non-tariff barriers will appear to take their places?s5
On balance it appears that a Canadian manufacturer dealing
with the Japanese market today is less likely to encounter the standards barriers he would have confronted a decade ago. Nevertheless,
standards will continue to operate as non-tar3 barriers as long as
disparities exist, and international harmonization of all technical
standards is an unrealistic aspiration as long as nations react to
divergent domestic, economic, cultural, social and political influences. I n the next section we attempt to articulate these influences
on product safety regulation in Japan, and suggest how they might
affect decisions to adopt Western standards and products liabiity
law.

V. JAPANESE PRODUCT SAFETY REGULATION AND
THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN IDEOLOGY
The high profile character of Western-Japanese trade relations
of the Japanand our often inexplicable and surprising ign~rance"~
ese makes any treatment of "the" Japanese national character susceptible to the pitfak of oversimplification and stereotyping. Mutual
misunderstandings are perhaps inevitable despite improved communication between the two cultures in this century.ls7 In addition, an
analysis of Japanese attitudes involves the danger of overemphasizing traditional Japanese culture and society while ignoring the
changes which have transpired since the Second World War. To
ignore the partial Westernization of traditional Japanese attitudes
Some recent comments in the Western press have been decidedly negative:
P. Agress, U.S. Calls on Japan to Eliminate Import Barriers, BUSINESS
A a r s ~ c 22
~ , March 1982, a t 4; U.S.Trade Deficit Cited in Friction with
Japan, THEGLOBEAND h,
20 Sept. 1984, a t B6, col. 5.
186 Western businessmen appear to be less willing to incur substantial expenditures on research of the Japanese market. In contrast to their Western
counterparts Japanese exporters thoroughly familiarize themselves with their
export markets. This is perhaps due to the pre-eminence of English as the
international language of commerce, and of Western business practices as the
method of transacting.
This factor may, however, be undergoing significant changes. See J.
Shinn, A New Wave of 'Japan-inn', Parts I and I1 in THEJAPAN ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, 20 and 27 Oct. 1981, a t 24. See also Abbott and Totman, supra,
note 12, at 147-50.
YJ7 E. Wilkinson, MISUNDERSTANDING,
EUROPEVERSUS JAPAN ( 1 9 8 2 ) ~at 13.
The very existence of labels such as 'Japan, Inc.' and 'the Japanese economic
animal' testify to the stereotyped perceptions many Westerners have of the
Japanese. Id., a t 75.
185
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and habits is to commit a grave sociological error.lS8We must emphasize that our purpose is not to present a comprehensive characterization of Japanese culture, but rather to abstract several relevant
cultural attributes which may assist us to understand present Japanese policies toward products safety regulation. It is our thesis that
these policies can be explained : first, by the Japanese aversion to risktaking, and the related preference for certainty and harmony; second, by their attitude towards foreigners; and third, by the absence
of an effectiveproducts liability litigation system.189 Before identifying the consequences of these social characteristics, we wish to elucidate briefly the historical, cultural and physical forces that make
these characteristic of Japanese society.
The Japanese cultural tradition stresses the priority of the "relationship", and thus the interests of the group over the interests of
the individual. It has its roots in lingering feudalistic values,l"O the
religious and cultural homogeneity of Japan's inhabitants,''' and
the teachings of C o n f u c i ~ s For
. ~ ~the
~ Japanese, the identity of the
individual is submerged in the larger group, whether it be family,
company, village or nation, and is constrained by the mutual obligations and duties owed to others and the group (on), as well as by a
set of rules of conduct known as gi~i."~ The pursuit of individual
goals is considered to be detrimental to the harmony of the group
(wa),in which there is a strict hierarchy imposing on the occupier
Id., a t 89-159.
The relevance of culture to explain Japanese economic success has been
noted by others. See K. Yamamura, supra, note 22, at 130. At least some
part of the regulatory framework within which Japan business operates must
be seen as "products of Japanese culture - to be recognized as such and seen
as inherent assets of Japanese society . .". Id., a t 13I.
190 The feudal regime was legally terminated only in the latter part of the last
century. R. Benedict, THECHRYSANTHEMUM
AND THE SWORD(1946). Japanese feudalism was a t its peak in the sixteenth century, but even prior to
that time clan-like social organization appears to have been a common
feature of Japanese society. See generally R. Cole, JAPANESE BLUE COLLAR
(1971) ; H. Wren, The Legal System of Pre-Western Japan (1968) 2 0
HAST. L.J. 2 17.
191 Y.Noda, The Far Eastern Conception of Law (1971) 2 INT'L
ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP.L. 120, a t 129.
192 Confucianism stresses obedience to a hierarchial system and the importance
of mutual personal obligations. Kim and Lawson, supra, note 48, a t 494.
193 Giri (gi: just or right; ri: reason or reasonable behaviour) means the manner of behaviour required of one person toward others in consequence of his
TO JAPANESE LAW ( I 976), a t 175.
social status: Y.Noda, INTRODUC~ON
For a detailed discussion of the Japanese system of obligations see Benedict,
supra, note 190, Ch. 6-7; Gibney, supra, note 20, Ch. 6.
189

.
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of each position a range of specific responsibilities, duties and rules
of conduct.
This collective consciousness has deep historical, religious and
cultural roots. Centuries of relative isolation have produced a homoJapangeneity which has had a significant socially cohesive
ese religion combines elements of Confucianism, Hinduism, and
Buddhism with Shintoism, and is responsible in part for encouraging
this group mentality. Confucianism, for example, emphasizes adherence to the accepted social order at the expense of individual action.lg5When Buddhism was adopted in Japan it had to be altered
so that it would not conflict with the Japanese social rank system,
for one of its tenets was the obliteration of social diitinctions.lg6As
the state religion, Shintoism was often invoked to cultivate national
unity. One author has coined the term 'Japanesism' to describe the
effect religion has had on social conduct? referring to a group
cohesion with strong religious overtones, and to an emphasis on
ceremony and ritual.
A central element of Japanese group consciousness is the family
relationship. Within the family there is a household head and an
established hierarchical ranking which determines the rights, privileges, and pattern of daily life of each family member. Associated
with a rank are duties and responsibilities to subordinates, since the
holder of a superior position in the group is, in Ruth Benedict's
words, a trustee, not an autocrat.lg8 This structure nurtures in the
Japanese a need for dependence (amae) on a superior,*9 and an
expectation that a person's stability and needs are the responsibility
of his senior. This atmosphere, where the achievement of individual
needs and ambitions is discouraged, and dependence on others for
security is encouraged, reflects a culture which places a high value
on certainty, and which may be described as averse to risk-taking
and conflict. Thus one may be able to articulate a cultural bias in
1%Wren,

supra, note 190, at 221; T. Ka\vashiia, The Status of the Individual
in the Notion of Law, Right and Social Order in Japan, in THEJAPANESE
OF JAPANESE
PHILOSOPHY
AND CULTURE
(Moore ed.
MIND: ESSENTIALS
1 9 6 7 ) at
~ 262.
195 Kim and Lawson, supra, note 48, at 496.
1%Gibney, supra, note 20, at 106.
197 I. Dasan (Y. Shichhei), JAPANESE
AND THE JEWS (1970); Wren, supra,
note 190, at 223.
198 Benedict, supra, note 190, at 54.
199 T. Doi, THEANATOMY
OF DEPENDENCE
(1973). Gibney, supra, note 20,
Ch. 6.
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favour of 'certainty' and avoidance of risk which is reflected in the
psychological discomfort which the Japanese experience when the
hierarchical social ranking is not e ~ t a b l i s h e d . ~ ~
The family-group concept pervades many aspects of Japanese
society because of its consistency (in different contexts) of attitudes,
expectations and values. At the workplace the collective interest is
equally pervasive.'O1 The lifetime tenure system, while not as pervasive as some believe, still applies to a significant portion of the
workforce. Together with its associated benefitsZoZit provides significant financial and social security for labour which may be unavailable in an individualistic, mobile labour market. Individual
goals are identified with, and perhaps subsumed by, company objectives, and social and psychological security is provided in the work
group. Thus the company is often referred to as uchi (my house)30'.
The relatively stable employment structure of Japanese industry is
consistent with the view of a culture which emphasizes certainty
and stability in relationships among its members. Risk aversion has
been found, in some cultures, to correlate directly with unwillingness
to experience job rotation, and with resistance to changes in job
activities.'04
The concept of the hierarchical family relationship as a social
ideal can be extended to the level of the national government, giving
it a paternalistic role in the regulation of its citizensy behavio~r.~O~
Paternalism may be more readily justified if one accepts that individual choice exercised through contract risk allocation may entail
substantial transaction and error costs, and that social responsibility
for victims of accidents justifies limited interference with individual
liberty. Although the co-operative nature of the government-business
Nakane, supra, note 2 I , a t 26-3 I.
recent statistical information compiled in a survey entitled Compariton
of Office Environment in Japan and the U.S.,see Japanese Prefer Working
in Big Rooms with Others to Lone Offices, THEJAPAN ECONOMIC
JOURNAL,
I I May 1982, a t 5. See also Yamamura, supra, note 22, a t 133.
202 These include automatic pay raises, housing, welfare and fringe benefits,
day care facilities and organized social events. R. Dore, BRITISH FACTORY
JAPANESE FACTORY(1973) ; F. Gibney, MIRACLEBY DESIGN (1982), at
55-72. Extended job security and associated benefits are enjoyed by an
estimated 25% of the workforce.
203 Nakane, supra, note 21, at 3. A von Mehren, Some Reflections on Japanese
Law (1958) 71 HARV.L. REV. 1486.
204 4
.
R. Greene, RISK AVERSION,
INSURANCE
AND THE FUTURE
(1971).
205 J. Strayer, The Tokugawa Period and Japanese Feudalism, in STUDIESIN
THE INSTITUTIONAL
HISTORYOF EARLYMODERNJAPAN ( I 968), a t 3, 8.

200
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relationship is perhaps better kno~vnto Western c~rnmentatoc?~~
the relationship between the individual and government is equally
noteworthy. Just as the Japanese individual in feudal society exchanged loyalty for protection from a lord, today he seeks similar
economic and social security from the state.'07 This national characteristic has been noted in corporate as well as private contexts.
Benjamin Rowland has analyzed Japanese corporate behaviour and
concludes that "the key to Japan's economic and financial system
..has been the premise that the state will serve as the risktaker of
last r e s 0 r t ~ ~Product
; 2 ~ ~ safety regulation which emphasizes government intervention ex ante, and which thus limits individual choice
in favour of insurance and rislr reduction, is consistent with thii
description of Japanese society.
Associated with paternalistic values which discourage individualism, the structured relationships of the group system provide its
members with security. That is, Japanese society is one in which it
is not generally accepted for the individual to make decisions without regard for the group and, in fact, is one where people are ill at
ease with such decisions because of their dependence for security
on the group and its accepted modes of conduct?09 In the context
of product safety regulation, these cultural attitudes would logically
lead to an emphasis on state and mandatory private products liability insurance programs, and on state programs which establish specified levels of product safety risk and which reduce the levels of risk
to a minimum level, taking into account social attitudes of dependency. These general cultural attitudes can be analyzed in two contexts. The first is the Japanese preference for domestic products,
which has been recognized as an important "third level" non-tariff

.

See Narita, supra, note 18; Yamanouchi, Administrative Guidance and the
Rule of Law (1974) ro LAWIN JAPAN22; Johnson, The Japanese Legal
Milieu and its Relationship to Business (1976) 13 Aar. Bus. L.J. 340, at 346.
207 In a statement released on 21 December 1982 by Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) on trade-related regulatory administration, it was recommended that this type of thinking be abandoned. The
Japanese tendency to look to the government to intervene to protect its
citizens should cease, it was suggested, and instead Japanese citizens should
stand on their ovrn feet. K K C Brief, No. 3, Jan. 1983.
-a
B. Rowland, Japanese Corporate Behaviour: An Outside View, in U.S.JAPANESE
ECONOMIC
RELATIONS:'COOPERATION,
COMPETITION,AND CONFRONTATION (D. Tasca ed. 1 9 8 0 ) ~
at 83, 84.
209 D. Haring, Japanese National Character: Cultural Anthropology, Psychoanalysis, and History (1953) 42 YALEREV. 375.
208

Heinonline - - 1 9 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 3 5 9 1 9 8 5

360

U.B.C. LAW REVIEW

VOL. 19:2

barrier.210The second js Japanese enterprises' approach to product
quality and safety decisions.
The strong Japanese identification with the group combined with
a sense of national insularity and vulnerability results in a 'them-us'
syndrome, which at a national level translates into a desire to keep
foreigners at a distance. This, of course, has been recognized as an
important subordinate factor in the non-tariff trade banier sector.211
For centuries the Tokugawa regime neither permitted Japanese citizens to travel abroad nor allowed foreigners to enter Japan. Japan
had to be forced into opening its doors to the West in the late
nineteenth century and treaties clearly adverse to Japanese interests
were imposed upon it.2" The country was deprived initially of its
customs autonomy and found itself unable to protect its domestic
industry from a flood of foreign imports. Japan was unable to revise
these treaties until it adopted a legal system acceptable to the
For geographical reasons Japan has relied almost exclusively on
imports for a considerable percentage of its resource materials, food
and oil?l4 which places the nation in a position of substantial economic dependence on multi-national corporate enterprise and foreign governments. The willingness with which governments use trade
sanctions for political or economic reasons has at times left Japan in
an extremely vulnerable position, and may have fostered a justifiable fear that inadequate supply and service is a risk of dealing with
a foreign supplier.215Reliance on foreign resources gave rise to the
generally held view that the Japanese were working at a dangerous
level of dependence on imports.216As a result many Japanese view
imports as inherently undesirable, and until recently have been reTASK
FORCEREPORT(1g80), supra, note 7. See Abbott and Totman, supra,
note 12, at 133-34.
211 Abbott and Totman, id.
212 Id., at 140.
3'2
Henderson, supra, note 46, at 577.
"4 In any given year Japan imports 99.8% of its oil, 88.7% of its natural gas
and 79.2% of its coal. Economic and Foreign Affairs Research Association,
OF WORLDENERGY
STATISTICS;
STATISTICAL
UNITEDNATIONSYEARBOOK
OF JAPAN'S
ECONOMY
(1981), at 29. See also The Man from
SURVEY
M I T I Speaks His Mind, FORTUNE,
4 Oct. 1982, Vo1. 106, NO. 7, at gz.
215 See N. Akao, JAPAN'S
ECONOMIC
SECURITY:RESOURCES
AS A FACTOR
IN
FOREIGNPOLICY (1983); R. Morse, THE POLITICSOF JAPAN'SENERGY
STRATEGY:
RESOURCES-DIPLOMACY-SECURITY
( I 98 I )
216 J. Hirschmeier, T. Yui, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF JAPANESE
BUSINESS16001980 (1981), a t 242-43.
210

.

Heinonline - - 19 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 360 1985

19~5

JAPANESE PRODUCT SAFETY

361

luctant to lift protectionist trade barriers and thereby encourage
increased foreign dependence.217An emphasis on the quality standards of foreign products may derive from a concern about leaving
product quality in the hands of foreign companies, which may be
accustomed to trading off (to a greater extent than would the Japanese) product safety or quality for lower production costs.21sThese
risks may not be subject to ex post litigation controls and, most important, will not be subject to the internalized constraints on behaviour which the Japanese enterprise may reflect. This is not to say
that all of Japan's actions in this regard have been justifiable, but
taking Japanese attitudes into account makes Japan's international
trade position more comprehensible to an outsider.
Cultural attitudes to~vardsrisk and conflict reflected in attitudes
to~vardsforeign goods may be reflected as well in the behaviour of
Japanese manufacturers to\vards product standards and quality control, which are significantly different than those adhered to by many
manufacturers in the West.219Although the term 'zero defects' originated in America, it has been the Japanese who have chosen to take
it seriously. Wherever feasible, the Japanese endeavour to inspect
each product for flaws or defects before it enters the market. They
may be willing to concede that 'perfection' is an unrealistic goal,
but that does not prevent them from striving to attain it. The detailed design specifications and rigorous certification procedures
complained of by Western business enterprises may reflect a concern
with detail which has been described as a generalized Japanese
cultural characteristic. Production of complex consumer goods "necessitates adherence to performance standards in each part, which
reflects each employee's wdlingnes to pay close attention to detail
As Cleaver
and his desire to assure the quality of the produ~t''.2~
This attitude towards foreign products is also apparent in the case of foreign
OF I~EPORTS
AND FOREIGN
CAPITAL
capital. See R. S. Ozaki, THECONTROL
IN JAPAN ( 1 9 7 2 ) ~
a t 124-26.
218 An example of one response by the Japanese is a private import agreement
pursuant to which the Japanese buyer establishes both the raw materials
and production formula for the product which it intends to import. See
THEJAPANESE ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, 6 Sept. 1983, at 14. I t has been reported that the Japanese hold the belief "that the American cars, in general,
are of inferior quality". R. Roy and A. Rassuli, International Trade Barriers
and the United States Automobile Industry (1983) 14 TOL.L. REV.263, at
277.
R. Schonberger, JAPANESE MANUFACTURING
TECHNIQUES
( 1 9 8 2 ) ~a t 61;
S. Kikuchi, Japanese Quality Control Method Increasingly Finds its Way
JOURNAL, I June 1982, at I I.
Abroad, THEJAPAN ECONOMIC
220 Yamamura, supra, note 22, a t 137.
"7
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has put it, employee attitudes may reflect "pride in the manufacture
of a good productY' .221
I n contrast, few Western manufacturers even attempt one hundred per cent inspection, but instead choose to apply random sampling methods of products quality
Rather than incurring
the additional immediate production costs associated with stringent
quality control, many Western manufacturers are willing to accept
the fact that there will always be a certain percentage of defective
products entering the market.223
The Japanese believe that quality is good and better quality is therefore better than lesser quality. They will go beyond any sort of rational trade-off to achieve this. For example, if you analyze the
percentage defects in a process and the costs of making that percentage less, you will very often find that it makes sense to go from
five percent defects to one percent defects. If you then ask whether
it makes sense to go from one percent defects to I / 10 of a percent
defects, the economists will generally say, "No, that does not make
sense." And the American firm will not, therefore, take that step.
The Japanese firm will. If you say to them, "That's silly. I t makes
no economic sense," they will answer, "We don't care. Better quality
is better than poorer quality." Once they get to I / I O of one percent,
they will go to I 1100or I / I ooo of one percent. Then they will look
at you with a disarming smile and say, "That's what makes us such
fierce competitors. You may be satisfied with one percent defects,
but we are not."
I n situations where one hundred per cent inspection is impractical
the Japanese have rejected the random sample method and have
selected alternative methods such as checking the first and last part
manufactured in every.lot. The rationale is that if the first part was
manufactured correctly the machine was working properly at the
outset, and if the last part is also flawless, then the process remained
stable throughout and all the parts in the lot are satisfactory.
The results of such quality control speak for themselves. The
Japanese ratio of defective auto part products is usually 0.1-0.276

221

C. G. Cleaver, JAPANESE
AND AMERICANS
: CULTURAL
PARALLELS
AND PAR(1976)' at 104.
Schonberger, supra, note 219, at 70.
Robert H. Hayes of the Harvard Business School quoted by Gibney, supra,
note 202, at 158. The quotation is taken from an interview in the film
People and Productivity: Learning from Japan, which was planned and
edited by Maurice B. Mitchell and Frank Gibney at the Pacific Basin Institute and produced by C. Olin for the Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational
Corporation.

ADOXES
222

223
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compared to a North American ratio of I . 0 - 2 . 0 % . ~ ~Standards
~
reflect similar attitudes. In the case of imported agricultural products,
the Japanese had established a "zero tolerance" level for prohibited
insects. Canadian export certificates, however, often identXed the
product as "substantially free" from the insect and thus Canadian
products would be denied entry.225The point is that product safety
regulation in Canada either explicitly or implicitly accepts that risks
to health, safety and lives can be evaluated in monetary terms and
that "acceptable levels" of risk must be established. On occasion the
Japanese must also do this,but they do not admit it so easily.
Allocation of risk of personal injury in exchange for compensating
payments in the form of price reductions may assume positive attitudes to\vards consumer sovereignty, an assumption which may be
less justifiable in the case of Japan than in some Western societies.
The Japanese may very well be willing to forego the welfare gains
associated with contract risk allocation in exchange for minimum
safety standards for a wide variety of consumer goods. Homogeneity
of attitudes towards risk may reinforce the view that a 'standard
formymultilateral contract with relatively rigorous safety standards
is desirable. Social welfare may be maximized by conscious directed
decisions regarding product safety rather than by atomistic market
decisions.226In dealing with risks to health and safety, decisions to
use market allocative devices, coupled with compensation through
litigation, assume a positive answer to the question "Do individuals
want to make the necessary and appropriate value judgments?" In a
society which is highly structured it may be that consumers would
prefer that experts replace them in that decision process. The benefits of certainty, the avoidance of risk, and distributional considerations may be associated with the view that "freedom from risk of
A. Kubota, Selling Canadian Auto Parts to Japan ( I ) -Indications are
Strong Japanese Will Rather Invest in Canada, THEJAPAN ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, 29 Sept. 1981, at 24.
225 MARKETS
FOR CANADIAN
EXPORTERS,
supra, note 37, a t 26.
226 Ozaki, supra, note 2 I 7, at 56. Studies on Japanese managers, employees and
investors are now frequently reported and published in the Western academic
press. Consumer behaviour has not been as widely analyzed, but it has been
noted that the behaviour, rather than being characterized by risk-taking, is
hierarchical, and that tastes are characterized by "generally accepted levels".
See Gibney, supra, note 20, a t 186-89.
Thus the phenomenon of expressed consumer demand for a variety of
goods, perhaps artificially distinguished from one another, and similar emulations of Western consumer behaviour and living styles were not generally
perceived as characteristics of the Japanese consumer until the early 1970s.
See D. Henderson, FOREIGNENTERPRISEIN JAPAN ( 1 9 8 3 ) ~a t 77; G. Allen,
JAPAN'S ECONOBIIC
POLICY( I 9 8 0 ) ~a t I 62-63.
22.1
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injury" is a merit good which ought to be allocated paternaistically
rather than through the market.227
Freedom is an ambiguous concept, carrying with it a price of
un~ertainty.~'~
Japanese society and culture emphasize the relative
status of specific groups and individuals, reducing the degree of uncertainty associated with one's role. The 'paternal' authority reflected in strict regulation of quality and product safety control,
which a substantial portion of the population assumes to be selfevident, encourages a high degree of certainty in a long-run sense.pg
This socialization of risk may represent a decision on the part of the
Japanese government that the benefits associated with individual
autonomy can be sacrificed for different social objectives. In contrast, in some Western countries in which ideological values emphasize individual autonomy, social policy demands that manufacturers in most situations be free to produce goods associated with a
higher degree of risk of personal injury, provided the consumer is
furnished with the necessary information and warnings to permit an
informed decision.230The view that personal injury risks are voluntarily assumed (at a price) is inconsistent with the Japanese philosophy that disputes are unnatural? that contracts and risk allocation are secondary to the natural spirit of friendship and good will?
and that the relationship of merchant and client is one of status,
with the client as the
Equally important to this analysis is an appreciation of product
safety regulation as a multi-institutional regulatory process. Product
design, safety risks and accident compensation objectives are influenced both by a priori replatory standards, and prospectively and
retrospectively by civil products liability claims. As described earlier,
the Japanese, for whatever reasons, have not adopted formal litigation of disputes with deterrent or cost-internalization objectives. A
call for relaxation of standards regulation in accordance with Western social ideals ignores the fact that the complementary alternative
See G. Mooney, Human Life and Suflering in THE VALUATION
OF SOCIAL
COST(D. Pearce ed. 1978), 120, at 125.
22s E. Fromm, ESCAPE
FROMFREEDOM
( 1941), Ch. 2.
229 A. Lauterbach, Social Factors in Business Uncertainty, in EXPECTATIONS,
AND BUSINESS
BEHAVIOR
(M. J. Bowman ed. I 958).
UNCERTAINTY
B0 R. Hirshhorn, Regulating Quality in Product Markets in THE REGULATION
OF QUALITY
(D. Dewees ed. 1983), 55, at 72-76.
See text accompanying notes 47-52.
232 Gibney, supra, note 20, at I 18-23.
233 Kim and Lawson, supra, note 48, at 5 I o227
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product safety regime (i.e., products liabiiilty law) has evolved quite
differently in Japan, where it may represent a more advanced stage
of evolution. Reform of the Japanese standards system would thus
seem to demand from the Japanese a reconsideration and reformulation of the civil liabiity of manufacturers for product-related
injuries. This is not to say that the dual task is necessarily either
impossible or undesirable. It simply points out that product safety
regulation involves two institutions, and that reform of the regulatory process in Japan is likely to be difficult, time-consuming and
particularly disruptive to existing legal and social norms in Japan
for a number of reasons.
First, regulatory control of product quality and safety is reinforced
by the magnitude and nature of bureaucratic power in Japan. Government standards regulation reflects an informal consensus of all
interested participants rather than a pure command model of state
interference with business enterprise. The co-operative structure of
government-business relations a s well as the interchange of personnel between the two communities suggest that regulatory supervision
in Japan does not mimic that of the West. Activities including standard setting may be generated by co-operative decisions of private
industry and the state.%* Thus, obligatory internationalization of
regulatory measures established through Western regulatory processes, if they differ from the co-operative processes of the Japanese,
may work to the disadvantage of the J a p a n e ~ e . ~ ~
Second, the emphasis of the Japanese on regulatory control of
product safety may reflect an acknowledgement that corporate
decision-making which takes place through collective action by
groups of managers diffuses accountability and responsibility, and
justifies risk-taking behaviour by business enterprise which would
not be undertaken by individuals.236
Third, the Japanese may believe that investments in quality and
safety regulation represent a form of accident insurance which will
K. M o c h i i , Government-Business Relations in Japan and the United
RELATIONS,
COStates: A Study in Contrasts, in U.S.-JAPANESEECONOMIC
OPERATION, CO~~~PETITION
AND CONFRONTATION,
supra, note 208, a t 86-88.
235 Japan Culture Institute, The Bureaucracy: Japan's Pool of Leadership, in
POLITICSAND ECONO~~ICS
I N CONTEMPORARY
JAPAN, Supra, note 22, a t 81,
85; N. Nobuyoshi, "Japan, Inc.": Reality or Facade?. Id., a t I 17.
236 R. Clark, THEJAPANESE COMPANY
(1g7g), at 126-27. Dore, supra, note
202, a t 227-28. Thii diiusion of responsibility, and thus the propensity for
greater corporate risk-taking than would be engaged in by individuals, suggests that ex-post compensation will prove to b e an unsatisfactory product
safety regulatory program. See Hirschmeier and Yui, supra, note 216, a t
254.
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not be carried out through atomistic market transactions. In the case
of personal injury losses, individuals consiitently under-insure either
because they underestimate the probability of the accident occurring,237or because they fail to take into account external costs.
Fourth, Japanese seem to understand, in a way that we are just
now recognizing, that "as far as the sociology of law is concerned"
corporate power is such that products liability law is not an effective
means of
The attitudes and behaviour of Japanese consumer gro~ps,23~
the administrative costs of organizing litigation,
and the corporate control of technical expertise all combine to limit
the effectiveness of litigation as a corporate control technique.
Fifth, in adopting a balance between civil products liability rules
and direct product safety regulation, the Japanese have acknowledged that the products liability system of safety regulation, while
it may bring reduced administrative costs, is ineffective where the
manufacturer does "not face the threat of suit for harm done".240
This risk of externalization of costs is magnified in the case of foreign manufacturers, where there are substantial structural barriers to
litigation, and where social attitudes provide exogenous disincentives to litigation.
Finally, the recent experience of the Japanese faced with catastrophic products liability injuries has inevitably contributed not only
to the promulgation of more rigorous product standards, but also to
the reluctance of the Japanese government to remove any of the
existing standards. As described previously, the Japanese have experienced serious and widespread injuries resulting from the activities of foreign manufacturers. The four pollution
the tha237

H. Kunreuther, DISASTERINSURANCE PROTECTION:PUBLICPOLICYLES-

(1978), a t I 13-15.
238 Otake, supra, note 84, a t 76, 86.
239 While organized consumer movements do exist, their roles have been generally limited to education and information initiatives. Reich, supra, note 59.
240 See S. Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety (1984) I3
J. OF LEGALSTUD.357, at 363.
241 ( I ) The Itai-itai disease in Toyama (Komatsu et al. v. Mitsui Kimuku,
Toyama District Court, 2 2 KAKYUMINSRU (NOS.5-6) Besatsu I, 30 June
1971; Aoyama et al. v. Mitsui Kintoku, Kanazawa Branch of Nagoya High
Court, 674 HANREIJIHO 25, g Aug. 1972). (2) Minamata disease in Niigata
(Ono et al. v. Showa Denko, Niigata District Court, 2 2 KAKYUMINSHU
(Nos. 9-10) 29 Sept. 1971). (3) Asthma a t Yokkaichi (Shiono et al. v.
Showa Yokkaichi Sekiyu et al., Yokkaichi Branch of Tsu District Court,
672 HANREIJIHO 30, 24 July 1g72), and (4) Minamata disease in Kumamot0 (Watanabe et al. v. Chisso, Kumamoto District Court, 696 HANREI
JIHO 15, 2 0 March 1973).
SONS
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lidomide ca~e,2~'
the Boeing case243and more recently the Chloroquine cases,- among others, have made injuries from defective
products a sensitive issue for the Japanese government. While some
judicial developments to aid plaintiffs in products liability suits resulted from these cases,245regulatory action has been taken to ensure
not simply that injured parties are more likely to be compensated
but, more important, that the injuries do not occur in the first
place.The present reluctance of the Japanese government to bring its
standards into complete accord with international standards is
clearly and succinctly summarized in a recent MITI publication
which states:'*'
The United States has been requesting that the Japanese Government allow U.S. manufacturers to self-certify compliance with Japanese standards on safety, etc. This suggests that we should adopt
the approach of dealing with accidents, etc., after the fact, i.e.,
through recall of cars from the market, civil judicial procedures,
etc. However, Japan's system on automobile accidents, pollutions,
etc. has long been predicated on the idea that they should be prevented before the fact. ...

It is difficult to prove any direct connection between product
safety regulation and Japanese legal ideology as we have characterized it. Nonetheless we do think that several points can be made.
Between 1954 and 1961 the Ministry of Health and Welfare issued permits
to manufacture a drug called "Isomin" which contained Thalidomide. After
1960 a significant number of infants were born with birth defects; 63 families sued the government and Dai Nippon Pharmaceutical Co. claiming
that the deformities had been caused by use of this drug. See H. Teff and C.
THELEGALAFTERMATH
(1976)~at 4, 7; K. TaMunro, TBALWOMIDE:
dashi, TRALIDOMIDE
IN JAPAN (1965)~a t 501-02.
243 Yabutani u. The Boeing Company, Tokyo District Court, 754 HANREI
JIHO
58, (1975) I9 JAP. ANN.OF INT'L
LAW225.
244 This antimalarial drug caused widespread side-effects such as retinitis. National Government Reaches First Settlement on Chloroquine Case, JAPAN
TRADE
LAWBULLETIN,
July 1982, at 13.
245 Id., at 15.
246 The Japanese goal of reducing the risk of injuries due to defective products
through standardization and inspection of goods prior to their entry on the
market has the effect of narrowing the options open to manufacturers and
consumers in dealing with products liability risks. Accident reduction costs
and costs of compliance, as well as insurance costs will, a t least to some
extent, be passed on to all consumers in the price of the product The
individual is not free to trade off price and risk of injury, but rather is
forced to pay for a minimum amount of safety and insurance.
247 MITI, REVIEWOF STANDARDS
AND CERTIFICATION
SYSTEMS(25 March
19831, at 7242
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First, the traditional cultural attributes of the Japanese, especially
their concern with hierarchy and ordering and the "communal and
anti-individualistic attitudes" of some litigants2" can be contrasted
with Western individualism and market allocative institutions.24g
Certainly, there is a correlation between culture and attitudes towards risk.250
Second, litigation is not a central political or social institution in
Japan. On balance, it is impossible to say whether this is due to
structural obstacles to litigationz5' or to culture, history and religion;
indeed, it does not matter. Our point is simply that the social phenomenon called "products liability" will not be resolved in Japan
through "ex post" tort compensation and "market deterrence"252to
the same degree that it is in Western societies. For some mixture of
reasons the Japanese response has favoured regulatory control of
this problem, and not litigati0n.2~~
In a recent paper Ronald Dore discussed the "obligational contracting" basis of Japanese market relationships? 54 Dore characterUpham, supra, note 48, at 613, 616.
See R. Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law (1981) 8 BRIT. J. OF LAW
& SOCIETY
199.
For example, contract law reflects a movement away from tradition and
hierarchical status relationships to relationships based on individual expressions of autonomy, free will and valuation of commodities. The ideology of
self-determination, the exercise of free will, a passive state and the immateriality of community ideals of justice are simply too significant to ignore in
the ideology of contract law in England and Canada. Traditional contract
theory chose to isolate the transaction and its participants from all preexisting social, cultural and even legal relations -the paradigmatic discrete
transaction so vividly pictured by Victor Goldberg and Ian Macneil. See V.
Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract (1976) 10
J. OF ECON.ISSUES
45; I. Macneil, THENEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT
(1g80),
at 1-18; P. Gabel and J. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology in THEPOLITICS
OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982), at 176-77.
250 M. Douglas and A. Wildavsky, RISK AND CULTURE:
AN ESSAYON THE
SELECTIONOF TECHNICAL
AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DANGERS( I g82), at
91-101.
251 See Haley, supra, notes 46 and 55.
25"- See Shavell, supra, note 240, and Calabresi, supra, note 89.
253 T. Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN
THELEGALORDERIN A CHANGING
SOCIETY(A. von Mehren ed.
JAPAN:
1963). H. Tanaka, THE JAPANESE LEGALSYSTEM(1g76), at 254.
2% R. Dore, Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism, based on the Hobhouse Memorial Lecture, London School of Economics, May 1983 (unpublished transcript). See also J. Landa (Institute for Policy Analysis), THE
ECONOMICS
OF THE ETHNICALLY-HOMOGENEOUS
MIDDLEMAN
GROUP:A
LOW-COSTCLUB-LIKEECONO~IIC
ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOF~IIZING
ON
CONTRACT-ENFORCEMENT
AND INFORMATION
COSTS, Working
- Paper
- No.
7924 (October I 979).
Landa ar.mes that. in the absence of a lead framework. the behaviour of
the actors i i constrained by a social strucGre which decieases information
costs associated with assessing the trustworthiness of the other participants.
248
249
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izes the Japanese contract model as embodying long-term relationships, a dynamic definition of these relationships, and mutual trust,
in contrast to the discrete contract model which underlies so much
of traditional Canadian contract doctrine. He explains the distinction between Western contracting models and the Japanese contracting model by reference to cultural sources, including the longterm future orientation of the Japanese, risk aversion, and a preference for equality and risk-sharing. The Japanese sense of duty
towards their (relational) contracting partner, and the associated
reduction in conflict is explained as an aspect of their culture and
history. This explanation of contract law is equally apt for Japanese
products liability law in particular, and for the regulation of product
safety in general. If these attitudes describe the Japanese character,
and have influenced the legal response to product safety regulation,
it is our view that Western trade policy which demands radical regulatory reform is ill-advised because it is insensitive to the reality of
Japan.
VI. A POSSIBLE COURSE O F ACTION
If it is true that we ought not to demand the crude Westernization
of Japanese product safety regulation, what alternative courses of
action are open to us? The problems associated with non-tariff standards barriers are substantially different from those with which
trade negotiators have had experience in the past. The following
remarks offer some tentative proposals for the development of trade
policy in the future.
One of the major difficulties with reform of standards barriers
arises from their specificity and diversity. Complaints have ranged
from the cost of metric and language labelling requirements to the
unacceptability of foreign inspection data and packaging design
standards, to the stringency of inspection requirements. Foreign suggestions for improvement have demanded that the Japanese internationalize their standards, abolish re-inspection of goods, exercise
administrative discretion to except minor transgressions, and accept
imperial and metric labelling. The initial stage of any Canadian
initiative in the area of non-tariff standards barriers must be the
acquisition of industry-specific or product-specific information relating to product standard trade barriers faced by Canadian industry.255Each particular commodity, and perhaps each product, faces
255

In A REVIEWOF CANADIAN
TRADE
POLICY,
published in 1983 by the Dept.
of External Affairs, only tcvo paragraphs in the 237-page document were
devoted to non-tariff standards bamers.
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a unique standard barrier.256The negotiation of such trade impediments requires identification of affected Japanese interests, consultation with the relevant governmental authority, articulation of the
non-trade related social, economic or product safety objective sought
to be achieved by the Japanese law, analysis of the validity of the
objective, identification of alternative means to achieve the objective, and then the articulation of appropriate proposals for reform
taking into account the legal structure of Japanese society.
Unlike tarifFs, the non-tariff standards banier involves issues, public and private enterprises, and constituencies which are not usually
present when the opponents or proponents of tariff and quota reduction proposals negotiate trade policy. At the very least, standards
barrier reforms involve piecemeal liberalization measures and do not
lend themselves to global solutions, nor even perhaps to quantification. A proposal which reflects these characteristics is the facilitation
of private consultation between Canadian industry and their private
Japanese counterparts in order to encourage the specific reforms
necessary in the case of particular manufactured products exported
to Japan.257Assiting groups such as the Canada-Japan Businessmen's Conferencezs8with its emphasis on private bilateral consultation and informal assistance in market penetration may be the most
efficacious method to reduce non-tariff standard barriers.
Thus one can argue that development of Canadian institutions
which deal specifically with product standards and certification barriers must have two characteristics. First, they must involve bilateral
See Foreign Firms are Irked Over Needless Procedures, supra, note 18,
a t I , 3.
257 I t should be recognized that many Japanese trade barriers have cultural or
social aspects and are not directly subject to governmental control. The
complex distribution system, parochial business practices, monopsonies and
cultural and language barriers are examples: supra, note 255, a t 155-56.
256

258

CANADA-JAPAN
BUSINESSMEN'S
CONFERENCE
REPORT(1983). The CanadaJapan Business Cooperation Committee has, since 1976, involved representatives from the private sectors in both countries in bilateral trade consultation, communication and negotiations. I t does not appear, however, that
standards barriers have been a major concern of the committee. Id. See also
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, WINNINGWORLDMARKETS
( I 978) ; Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce, MARKETS
FOR CANADIAN EXPORTERS:
JAPAN (1979) ;F. Langdon, THEPOLITICS
OF CANADIANJAPANESE ECONOMIC
RELATIONSI 952-1983 ( I g83), a t 145.
Bilateral negotiations of trade barriers relating to product standards may
further a Canadian interest in acting independently of the United States.
Langdon, id., a t 77. As well, governmental efforts to increase trade in
manufactured goods have been historically unsuccessful. The primary actors
must be private enterprises: id., a t go.
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negotiations with J a p d 5 ' which while acknowledging the multilateral aspect of standards barriers, will focus on the particular nontariff product standards barriers which characterize Canada-Japan
trade. At the same time the peculiar balance of governmental and
private institutions which d e h e the Japanese industrial complex,
and the product-specific nature of most standards barriers demand
that the negotiations involve both commercial and governmental
representatives in co-operative ventures. This "product by productyy
approach wiU, it seems, serve broader Canada-Japan trade interests
as well?'"
Moreover, business enterprises, whether engaged in these bilateral
negotiations or acting independently, must be willing to engage in
expensive and time-consuming marketing investments to overcome
linguistic barriers, cultural biases, the complex Japanese distribution system and other non-legal barriers. The unilateral authority
of the Japanese government to modify these practices is limited,
further supporting the necessity of private commercial activity.z61To
the extent that the Canadian government is involved, it must be willing to invest in a similar manner in order to deal effectively with
the complex political and economic environment of Japan, especially in view of the mixture of second and third order social and
cultural considerations reflected in non-tariff standards
Japanese trade barriers may be reduced, as well, through unilateral Canadian action. Recent developments in standard-setting
which effectively delegate regulatory power to private standardsetting bodies consisting of manufacturing interests permit international trade effects to be considered in the development of Canadian standards.283It is fair to say that Canadian manufacturers will
take into account foreign marketing opportunities in a consensus
model of standard-setting. The effect may be that Canadian standards complement Japanese standards.
A further recommendation is directed at the implementation stage
of product standards, which includes the administrative review process and certification procedures. Canadian industry and government
See A REVIEWOF CANADIAN
TRADE
POLICY,supra, note 257, at 203.
Id., at 220-22.
261 Japan Makes Serious Bid to Open Markets, FINANCIAL
POST,Special Report
on Japan, 28 May 1983, at s. 3, col. 4.
262 Abbott and Totman, supra, note 12, at 147-50.
263 C.S.A. President Advocates Consensus as Alternative to Government Rules,
THEGLOBEAND MAR, 20 July 1982, at B I , col. I .
259

260
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must make substantial investments in order to participate effectively
in Japanese standard-setting, testing and certification bodies, as well
as in Japanese trade associations. The recent experiences of American industry suggest that Japan is beginning to permit foreign representation in limited sectors of its standard-setting institutions.264
Private unilateral action may also take the form of the establishment of a Canada-Japan Trade Office (CJTO) in Canada. The
Trade Promotion division of the Bureau of Pacific Affairs in the
Department of External Affairs is currently responsible for the task
of resolving standards barrier disputes. The Pacific Relations division
in the Department is not involved with these issues, and the JointEconomic Committee, consisting of government representatives from
both countries focuses on issues of far broader scope than non-tariff
standards barriers. The Trade Promotion Group currently deals with
each non-tariff standards barrier case which is brought to its attention on a reactive basis, and is unable to collect comprehensive data
on the impact of non-tariff barriers on Canada-Japan trade. The
Canada-Japan Trade Office would, of course, perform the important function of acting as a conduit and focus for business enterprise in order to make known to government the existence of nontariff trade barriers. The export orientation of the CJTO would
co-ordinate trade policy with Japan and, more important, would
act as a liaison between Canadian regulators, business enterprise
and the Japanese government. The CJTO would communicate directly with the Office of Fair Trading in Japan and with the Office
of Trade Ombudsman established in Japan as a result of United
States neg0tiations.2~~
The experience of the Office of Trade Ombudsman in Japan confirms the idiosyncratic, highly variable nature
2%

265

See supra, note 181. In addition, the Treasury Board Directive mandating
socio-economic impact analysis for major federal regulations obliges federal
regulators to take into account international trade aspects of proposed regulatory measures. See Treasury Board Canada, Administrative Policy Manual,
Chapter 490, Socioeconomic Impact Analysis, December 1979, 3.3.2.(g) ;
and Appendix E, Evaluation Methodologies, at 2.4. See also REPORTOF
THE JAPAN-UNITED
STATESECONOMIC
RELATIONS
GROUP,sujra, note 14, at
59-60, 69.
Canadian manufacturers can, through private negotiations, reduce the
impact of standards established by private industry in Japan. See Personal
Computers Multi-Function Models Introduced in Succession, THE JAPAN
ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, 4 Oct. 1983, at 29.
The Japan-United States Economic Relations Group, SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT OF THE JAPAN-UNITED
STATESECONO~IIC
RELATIONS
GROUP,prepared for the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of
Japan, October I 981, at I 7, 18. Trade Barriers Come in Creative Packages,
INDUSTRY
WEEK,5 April 1982, NO. I, at 26.
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of industry complaints in this context. The CJTO would, it seems,
perform a function similar to that of the Trade Facilitation and
Trade Study Groups in the United States in providing detailed sectoral analysis of Japanese business practicesSs6 Experience in those
contexts suggests that private and informal consultative institutions
are likely to lead to more profitable negotiations. As well, the informal consultative process in which this office would engage would
seem to be consistent with Japanese practices, while ensuring the
involvement of the Canadian g0vernrnent.2~'At the very least, this
institution would collect data on standards barriers and detail the
peculiar problems which Canadian exporters face, whether they relate to inspection procedures, enforcement decisions, standards or
foreign certification requirements.
The impetus for much of the reform that has taken place so far
has been the influence of American and E.E.C. interests which has
resulted in indirect benefits to Canadian trade
The lesson is that these bilateral and unilateral measures described above
must be augmented by co-operation with American and European
interests in multilateral negotiations concerning specific standards
and standards barriers.269In specific cases co-operation with American interests at international standard-setting organizations will be
an effective strategy for penetrating the Japanese marketP0 At the
very least we should recognize that Canada is not one of Japan's
leading trade partners, and that our interests may be sacrificed if
Japan responds bilaterally to the concerns of its major trading partner~.~"
This suggests that Canada should continue its international
activities in international standards organizations, and should conSee TASKFORCEREPORT
( 1 9 8 0 ) at
~ 14-15. TASKFORCEREPORT
(1979)~
at 5. See Abbott and Totman, supra, note 1 2 , at I 12-14.
267 United States-Japan Trade White Paper, supra, note 7.
2" Japan Eases Test Rules on Products, T H EGLOBEAND MAIL, 27 Feb. 1984,
, I.
at I B I ~col.
269 EEC Renews Demands on Japan to take Import Promotion Steps, T H E
JAPAN E C O N O ~ EJOURNAL,
IC
I I O c t 1983, at 3 ; I I I C Co-ordination Urged,
T H EGLOBEAND MAIL, 7 O c t 1983, at B I ~col.
, 3.
270 Hard Work Pays Off
For Canadian Exporters of Refrigerators, C O N S E N S U S ,
October 1983, Vol. 10, No. 4, at 10; Canadian Chain Saw Exporters Could
Benefit from New Standard, id., at I I .
271 M. Donnelly, Growing Disharmony i n Canadian-Japanese Trade ( I 98 I ) 36
INT'L JOURNAL879, at 883. F. Langdon, Problem of Canada-Japan EGOnomic Diplomacy in the 1960's and rg~o's,the Third Option, in CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVES
ON E C O N O ~ X
REZATIONS
M
W I T H JAPAN ( K . Hay ed. 1g80),
at 73.
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tinue to be sensitive to United States-Japan non-tariff barrier negotiations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our description of Japanese products liability law and regulatory
standards, the elucidation of the underlying rationales of Japanese
product safety regulation, and our articulation of tentative proposals
for Canadian trade negotiators, does not have the purpose of seeking
to vindicate Japanese international trade measures. It does however seek to demonstrate that the view that Japanese international
trade policy is unnecessarily protectionist is perhaps a narrowminded one. While the Westernization of Japanese culture in the
twentieth century is undeniable, it is ethnocentrism taken to its worst
extreme to ignore Japanese history and values and assume that
regulatory measures which North American countries may consider
desirable for themselves are similarly desirable for Japan.
Several decades ago a book was written called The Taming of the
Nations,272the thesis of which is compellingly appropriate to trade
relations with Japan today. According to its author, to be effective a
nation's law must correspond to its ideological inner order, a phrase
which refers to the normative values, beliefs and habits of a peo~ l e . 2Further,
~~
an effective international policy for relations with
that nation must recognize and take into account its ideological
inner order.274This paper has explored that part of the Japanese
ideological inner order which may be relevant to product safety
regulation. Our conclusion is that international trade relations in
product safety matters may require a substantially different strategy
than that which is appropriate for Western nations. Successful trade
relations with Japan in the long term cannot be achieved without a
sensitivity to Japanese culture and values.
F. S. C. Northrop, THETAMING
OF
TURAL
273

27'

THE NATIONS:
A STUDYOF
BASESOF INTERNATIONAL
POLICY
( I 97 I )

.

THE

Id., at 5.
Id., at 6.
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